United Nations A/68/892–S/2014/380

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
29 May 2014

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-eighth session
Agenda item 42
Question of Cyprus

Security Council
Sixty-ninth year

Letter dated 27 May 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 23 May 2014 addressed to you from the Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Mehmet Dânâ (see annex).

I would be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly under agenda item 42, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Y. Halit **Çevik**
Permanent Representative

14-54256 (E) 020614

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 27 May 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I am writing in response to the letters dated 9 and 15 May 2014 addressed to you by the Greek Cypriot representative in New York and circulated as documents of the Security Council (S/2014/327 and S/2014/352), which yet again contain false assertions similar to those made in his previous letters. In order to set the record straight, I would like to bring the following to your kind attention.

At the outset, regarding the claims of so-called "infringements of international air traffic regulations" and "violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey", I wish, once again, to reiterate that flights within the sovereign airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus take place with the full knowledge and consent of the relevant authorities of the State, over which the Greek Cypriot administration in South Cyprus has no jurisdiction or right of say whatsoever. The civil aviation authority of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is the only competent authority to provide air traffic and aeronautical information services within its own national airspace. Likewise, the allegation made in the aforementioned letters in relation to Turkish Cypriot ports is also unfounded, given the fact that the Greek Cypriot administration has no jurisdiction or right of say over Northern Cyprus. This represents yet another attempt aimed at distorting the facts and the realities of the island. As noted in our previous letters, such assertions are based on the false and unlawful claim that the sovereignty of the Greek Cypriot administration extends over the whole island, including the territory, national airspace and territorial waters of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. This pretentious contention by the Greek Cypriot side ignores the present realities on the ground, namely, the existence of two independent, self-governing States on the island of Cyprus, each exercising sovereignty and jurisdiction within its respective territory.

As for the repeated unfounded allegations regarding Ercan airport in the North, it should once again be underlined that the technologically up-to-date Ercan area control centre and airport in North Cyprus have been providing constant, reliable and safe air traffic services since the Greek Cypriot refusal in 1977 to provide air traffic services in the northern part of the island in line with the Greek Cypriot isolation policy imposed on the Turkish Cypriot people. Ever since, all flights within the sovereign airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus have taken place with the full knowledge and consent of the Civil Aviation Department of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, over which the Greek Cypriot administration in South Cyprus has no jurisdiction or control.

The legislation on aeronautical safety of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus meets all International Civil Aviation Organization standards and recommendations, providing safe and swift navigation of aircraft landing at or taking off from Ercan airport, as well as using Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus airspace. All airports in Northern Cyprus are in full conformity with international standards and necessary investments have been made to keep up with the developing technology. The number of air traffic controllers has been increased in accordance with the increasing number of flights over the years and the Ercan area control centre is in constant and close cooperation with the Ankara area control centre in

order to ensure the safe conduct of all flights in the region. In 2013 alone, the number of passengers that used Ercan airport stood at almost 3 million, while the projected number of passengers for 2014 is 3.2 million. Moreover, in 2013, around 22,000 planes used Ercan airport for arrival and departure and 150,000 planes used Ercan advisory airspace. These numbers are expected to be around 23,000 and 165,000 respectively for 2014. The Turkish Cypriot side remains committed to upholding the highest standards in the field of air navigation safety in full conformity with the Convention on International Civil Aviation of 1944 and is ready to cooperate with the Greek Cypriot authorities on this very important issue.

Continuous attempts by the Greek Cypriot side, through often-repeated false accounts, to confer legitimacy upon the long-defunct "Republic of Cyprus" are futile since the Turkish Cypriot people will never give in to their unjust demands. What would indeed be conducive to a better climate on the island is for the Greek Cypriot side to stop arrogating for itself rights and responsibilities it does not legally have and to cease its hostile and offensive acts against the Turkish Cypriot people. Moreover, the Greek Cypriot administration should once again be reminded that its counterpart is, and has always been, the Turkish Cypriot side, not Turkey, and that its insistent denial of the Turkish Cypriot rights in the North of the island does not bode well for the prospects of finding a lasting settlement of the Cyprus conflict in line with the established United Nations parameters, which envisage a new partnership on the basis of the political equality of the two peoples of the island within the framework of a bizonal, bicommunal federation with two constituent States of equal status.

Availing myself of this opportunity, I would like to call on the Greek Cypriot side to cease its well-known propaganda tactics and focus on the full-fledged negotiations conducted under your good offices mission to reach a comprehensive settlement in Cyprus without further delay. As the Turkish Cypriot side, we are committed to maintaining our constructive and positive stance and encourage our Greek Cypriot neighbours to follow a similar path.

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 42, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mehmet **Dânâ**
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

United Nations A/68/893–S/2014/378

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
29 May 2014
English
Original: Arabic

General Assembly
Sixty-eighth session
Agenda item 70 (a)
Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian and disaster relief assistance of the United Nations, including special economic assistance: strengthening of the coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance of the United Nations

Security Council
Sixty-ninth year

Identical letters dated 27 May 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I should like to convey to you the position of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic regarding the third report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2139 (2014) (S/2014/365):

First, the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic would like to reiterate its commitment to ensuring that humanitarian assistance reaches all persons affected by the crisis without distinction. It would also like to reiterate that it cooperates with the United Nations and its agencies in connection with this matter on the basis of respect for the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, international law and the guiding principles of United Nations humanitarian assistance in emergency situations as set out in General Assembly resolution 46/182, in particular the principle of respect for national sovereignty and the role of the State in supervising the distribution of humanitarian assistance in its territory, and for the principles of neutrality, impartiality and non-politicization. Syria furthermore reiterates that the humanitarian crisis that is developing in many parts of Syria cannot be addressed solely by providing emergency supplies to the population. Rather, it is essential to address the roots of the problem and the factors that are exacerbating it. First and foremost, that means countering and eradicating terrorism and rescinding unilateral coercive measures.

Second, in his meeting with the members of the High Relief Commission on 4 May 2014, the President of the Syrian Arab Republic stressed that the humanitarian situation and its implications was the Syrian State's top priority. He further stressed that all resources must be marshalled to meet the pressing need to

provide shelter, food and medicine to all civilians who had been forcibly displaced as a result of the crimes committed by terrorist groups. He furthermore emphasized that the Syrian State was responsible for the welfare of all its citizens and for meeting their basic needs not only in the locations to which they have been displaced, but also in those areas that are besieged by terrorists.

Third, having considered the Secretary-General's third report, the Syrian Government would like to make the following observations:

1. It is regrettable that those United Nations officials who are responsible for drafting the above-mentioned report continue to ignore the fact that terrorism has given rise to and exacerbated the humanitarian needs in Syria. They insist on addressing the humanitarian situation in Syria in a manner that is selective, biased and politicized and that disregards the guiding principles of United Nations humanitarian assistance. Following are some examples of that:

- The report uses the term "armed opposition" to refer to terrorist organizations that the Security Council has designated as being affiliated with Al-Qaida. It is particularly puzzling that the report adopts a doubtful tone with regard to the presence of foreign terrorists in the ranks of the terrorist organizations operating in Syria. Such a position is contrary to official reports issued by many States affirming the presence of terrorists who are nationals of the reporting States and who came to fight in Syria via Turkey. It also runs counter to the experience of the United Nations itself with the Muhajirin wal-Ansar Brigade, which is composed primarily of foreign terrorists. This group prevented the United Nations on two successive days from delivering aid to the villages of Nubul and Zahra and forced it to change the route of the aid convoy.

- The report continues to diminish the magnitude of the crimes and other actions for which armed terrorist groups are clearly responsible. One such example of this is the report's account of how terrorist groups cut the supply of potable water and clean water to millions of residents in Aleppo as punishment.

2. The Syrian Government deplores the continued attempts of some States and Secretariat officials to legitimize the violation of Syria's sovereignty under the pretext of delivering humanitarian assistance and to do so without the approval of the Syrian Government. These attempts, which come at a time when the report on the implementation of the resolution is to be presented to the Security Council, are a blatant violation of the Charter of the United Nations, the principles of international law and resolution 2139 (2014). In that connection, it should be noted that the presentation of inflated figures regarding humanitarian needs in certain parts of Syria is an attempt to justify this politicized and devious conduct. Syria condemns the distortion of the Charter by the Secretariat and its presentation of an inaccurate interpretation of the concept of sovereignty in order to legitimize the delivery of humanitarian assistance without the approval of the Syrian Government, including through border crossings controlled by terrorist groups. Such conduct is a stark violation of resolution 2139 (2014). Do the authors underestimate the intelligence of the readers and believe that they will only read the report but not understand it? The delivery of assistance to Kafr Hamra, Huraytan, Mayir, Ma'arat Artiq, Hayyan, Anadan, Nubul, Zahra and other places in the northern Aleppo countryside where terrorist groups are active refutes the slanderous remarks contained in the report that the Syrian Government is hindering the delivery of assistance to certain areas.

Syria rejects the recommendations of the Secretariat and advises it to resume being impartial and fair, avoid politicization and not to be a malleable instrument in the hands of certain Western States that are well known for their colonial history and ambitions, if it truly wishes to help those that have been affected by the Syrian crisis.

3. The report constantly attempts to come up with reasons to hold the Syrian Government responsible for hindering the delivery of assistance in order to avoid acknowledging the fundamental obstacles that are standing in the way of the Organization's humanitarian efforts. The most significant of those obstacles are terrorism, a severe lack of funding and lack of effectiveness and coordination on the part of United Nations agencies engaged in such work. Lack of funding continues to be a serious obstacle to the efforts of the Organization's humanitarian agencies to secure and deliver humanitarian assistance. Certain States continue to deny funds to the United Nations for political motives; much of those funds are being diverted illegally to so-called cross-border operations, in flagrant violation of resolution 2139 (2014). According to the report, of the $214.9 million collected, only $163.7 million was allocated for humanitarian response efforts inside Syria during the current period. According to the United Nations, this is a far cry from the $2.2 billion required to implement the 2014 response plan. These figures demonstrate how this financial vulnerability has affected the Organization's ability to execute the response plan and led to a decline in the number of persons receiving assistance in the period covered by the report. This situation raises concerns regarding the fundamental ability of the United Nations to shoulder its responsibility to provide humanitarian assistance.

4. Syria rejects the Secretariat's efforts to blame the Syrian Government completely for the gross failure of United Nations agencies to deliver humanitarian assistance. In that connection, we should like to note that, in the reporting period, the United Nations requested approval to dispatch aid convoys to the Homs, Idlib, Aleppo and Hamah countryside and to Rif Dimashq. According to the United Nations, these are all difficult-to-reach or besieged areas. The Government approved the majority of requests. An aid convoy entered Duma, Rif Dimashq, on 24 May 2014. This is the third time that humanitarian assistance has reached this area. However, no such assistance has reached Adra al-'Ummaliyah to date, despite the repeated requests of the Syrian Government.

5. References to incidents of the alleged use of toxic gas were forcibly introduced into certain parts of the report. These incidents do not fall within the scope of resolution 2139 (2014) and their inclusion is an attempt to confound the technical agency responsible for investigating these allegations following Syria's accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention.

6. In several instances, the report relies on dubious and unverified sources and misrepresents or alters information. For example:

- The report refers to violations allegedly committed in Aleppo Central Prison when neither the United Nations nor any other party is capable of determining their veracity because of the total siege that terrorist groups have imposed since the beginning of the year.
- In its account of the evacuation of fighters from the old city of Homs, the report claims that the evacuation was conditional upon the release of

government-affiliated individuals. We are surprised that the report used this designation to refer to a group of women and children who had been abducted by armed terrorist groups. The children in the group ranged from 7 months to 2 years of age. It is even more surprising that the United Nations should use such biased expressions, as though it was offering justification for incidents of abduction of women and children that the United Nations team had documented.

- The report claims to have documented information on attacks against schools, hospitals and houses of worship in the period from 1 January to 31 March 2014. Incidents that occurred between 22 April 2014 and the report's publication are supposedly documented.

- The report claims to have documented information on attacks against 53 schools, including at least two attacks that occurred in areas the United Nations has been unable to reach. This fact refutes the accuracy of the claims made. Which agency documented those attacks? How can the United Nations use such information without direct verification by its officials? The latter question is particularly relevant given that the United Nations has long relied on the excuse that it is unable to reach certain areas as a pretext for not using the information the Syrian Government provides it. Syria has repeatedly called on the United Nations to document the crimes that armed terrorist groups have committed against more than 3,004 schools. However, the United Nations failed to do this on the grounds that it was unable to reach the areas in which the attacks occurred. In 2012 and 2013, United Nations agencies reported the names of only 12 schools.

7. The procedure adopted by the Syrian Government for the issuance of visas has resolved this question definitively. The report nonetheless continues to raise this question in a manner that is both imprecise and subjective.

8. The Syrian Government is committed to facilitating the movement of trucks carrying aid in order ensure that assistance reaches all those who need it throughout the country. To rein in the chaos and alleviate the futility associated with humanitarian efforts, agreement was reached with the United Nations on 20 May 2014 regarding a new procedure to facilitate the movement humanitarian convoys and enable them to reach their destinations. The report incorrectly claims that, over a period of two weeks, some technical problems had occurred owing to what it calls a lack of harmonization among the relevant Government agencies and of a common understanding of the procedure for the movement of humanitarian assistance. It also claims that those problems had caused 150 trucks carrying aid to be stopped in various parts of the country and led to a decline in the level of assistance. On 14 May 2014, the World Food Programme office contacted the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding those trucks. By 22 May 2014, the status of 121 of those trucks had been resolved, and the relevant agencies are looking into the status of the rest.

9. The report once again fails to mention the negative impact unilateral coercive measures have had on the Syrian people. In that connection, it should be noted that, in its 2013 report on the international economic situation, the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs noted that the unilateral economic sanctions imposed by the United States of America and its allies have affected Syrian civilians' standard of living and their ability to meet their basic needs.

Fourth, the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic affirms that it will continue to fulfil its constitutional duty to use every means to protect its citizens from the terrorist crimes that have been directed against them. Syrians have been the victims of terrorist bombings and daily rocket attacks that indiscriminately strike their homes, workplaces, educational and medical institutions, and religious and historical sites in all governorates. At the same time, the Government continues to strive earnestly to reach a political solution and bring about national reconciliation. This is Syria's national strategy. The success achieved in Homs is but one example of the fruits of that strategy and was preceded by successes in Rif Dimashq, Aleppo, Hamah and other governorates. The Syrian Government continues to make serious efforts to restore security and stability to areas that have been affected by terrorism, with a view to finding a political solution and saving the lives of civilians and returning them to their homes.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 70 (a), and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations A/68/894–S/2014/383

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
30 May 2014

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-eighth session
Agenda items 33 and 38

Security Council
Sixty-ninth year

Prevention of armed conflict

The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan

Letter dated 26 May 2014 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to draw your attention to the ongoing violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan recorded for the month of April 2014 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 33 and 38, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Tigran **Samvelian**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.
Deputy Permanent Representative

14-54358 (E) 100614

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 26 May 2014 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 1-30 April 2014

1. On the borderline of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic:

   Total number of violations — 1,574

   Total number of shots ~ 8,769

   AK ~ 5,408, PK ~ 2,020, SVD ~ 691, DSHK ~ 113, RPK ~ 141, Black arrow ~ 60, Istigall ~ 306, Utyos ~ 16, NSVT ~ 14

2. On the borderline of the Republic of Armenia (see table below):

   Total number of violations — 268

   Total number of shots ~ 5,499

   AK ~ 1,617, PK ~ 2,208, SVD ~ 251, DSHK ~ 1,347, RPK ~ 42, Black arrow ~ 34

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of violations*
1.	1 April	Barekamavan	1555	SVD	4	
2.		Aygepar	2240	AK	4	
3.	2 April	Agarak	1650	AK	4	
4.	3 April	Movses	1020	SVD	1	
5.			1140	DSHK	10	
6.				PK	10	
7.		Barcruni	1035	PK	20	
8.	5 April	N.Karmiraghbyur	1325	DSHK	20	
9.		Aygepar	1840	PK	4	
10.		Kayanavan	2035	AK	8	
11.	6 April	Chinari	0900	SVD	3	
12.			1005	AK	5	
13.		Movses	1655		1	
14.		Agarak	1930		12	
15.			2030		2	

Abbreviations: AK, Kalashnikov rifle; PK, Kalashnikov machine gun; SVD, 7.9 mm sniper weapon; DSHK, 12.7 mm machine gun; RPK, 5.45 mm machine gun; Black arrow, 12.7 mm sniper weapon; Istigall, 14.5 mm machine gun; NSVT, 12.7 mm machine gun.

No.	Date	Direction	Time	Type of weapon	Ammunition	Results of violations
16.		Sarigyugh	2230		5	
17.		Berqaber	2230		4	
18.	7 April	Dovegh	0130	AK	20	
19.		Aygepar	0315	PK	45	
20.			0350		10	
21.			0405		4	
22.			1545	AK	5	
23.	8 April	Movses	0840	Black arrow	1	
24.			1350	DSHK	4	
25.			1600	AK	2	
26.			2030	Black arrow	2	
27.		Chinari	1210	AK	4	
28.		Berdavan	1850		20	
29.		Sev Qar	2240	SVD	7	
30.		Dovegh	2055	AK	20	
31.			2120		15	
32.	9 April	Chinari	1550	AK	4	
33.			1600		10	
34.		Movses	1725		2	
35.		Berqaber	1800	SVD	2	
36.	10 April	Paravaqar	0940	PK	4	
37.		Movses	1100	DSHK	2	
38.			1630	AK	1	
39.			1910		4	
40.		Dovegh	1100		8	
41.			1135		4	
42.		Berdavan	1135		4	
43.		Voskepar	1140		31	
44.		Chinari	1325	Black arrow	3	

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of violations*
45.	11 April	Movses	1010	Black arrow	1	At 1210 near the village of Horadiz at the borderline with Azerbaijan, in a combat position soldier Harutyun Qirajyan was injured by fragments from the Azerbaijani side.
46.			1805	SVD	1	
47.		Chinari	1025	SVD	1	
48.		Aygepar	1140	SVD	1	
49.			1200	Black arrow	1	
50.			2150	AK	1	
51.		Vazashen	1935	AK	2	
52.		Jil	2115		8	
53.	12 April	Dovegh	1250	AK	20	At 1650 near the village of Leonarkh at the borderline with Azerbaijan, in a combat position soldier Seyran Andranikyan was wounded from the Azerbaijani side.
54.		Aygepar	1425	SVD	1	
55.			1800		6	
56.			1935	PK	17	
57.			1937		9	
58.			1950	SVD	2	
59.			2235	AK	5	
60.			2239		10	
61.		Vazashen	1700		10	
62.		Berqaber	2230		5	
63.			2230		5	
64.	13 April	Khndzorut	1325	AK	2	
65.		Eraskh	1515		8	
66.	14 April	Aygepar	1045-1110	AK	2	
67.				Black arrow	3	
68.			1305	PK	7	
69.			1550	SVD	1	
70.			1635	AK	1	
71.			1750	PK	4	
72.			1815-1840	DSHK	16	
73.			1850-1910		10	
74.			1915-1950		60	
75.			2000-2100		60	

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of violations*
76.			2100-2200	DSHK	150	
77.				PK	1 300	
78.		Movses	1045-1110	AK	1	
79.			1130	DSHK	9	
80.			1150		4	
81.			1850-1910	PK	60	
82.				DSHK	90	
83.			1915-1950		120	
84.			2000-2100		50	
85.			2100-2200		190	
86.		N.Karmiraghbyur	1045-1110	PK	4	
87.			1150	DSHK	1	
88.			1150	DSHK	1	
89.			1735		4	
90.			1735	PK	4	
91.			1805	DSHK	4	
92.			1815-1840		10	
93.			1850-1910		35	
94.			1915-1950		80	
95.			1930-1950		15	
96.			2000-2100		60	
97.			2100-2200		220	
98.		Voskepar	1420	SVD	5	
99.		Barekamavan	1545		12	
100.		Eraskh	1840	AK	5	
101.		Mehrab	1930	SVD	11	
102.				AK	9	
103.		Paravaqar	1930-1950	DSHK	25	
104.		Chinari	2000	DSHK	25	
105.			2000-2130	AK	250	
106.				SVD	20	

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of violations*
107.				DSHK	50	
108.		Vazashen	2210	SVD	20	
109.		Berdavan	2340	AK	10	
110.	15 April	Paravaqar	0050	AK	15	
111.			0100		10	
112.		Aygepar	0225	SVD	3	
113.			0800	RPK	1	
114.		Berdavan	1140	AK	5	
115.		Vazashen	1700		6	
116.		Barcruni	1725	SVD	1	
117.		Shavarshavan	1835	PK	5	
118.		Omar	2100-2130		15	
119.	16 April	Paravaqar	0120	AK	8	
120.		Chinari	0325	AK	5	
121.			1800	SVD	3	
122.		Vazashen	1100	AK	2	
123.		Barekamavan	1120	PK	25	
124.			1500		15	
125.		Sarigyugh	1500	AK	10	
126.		Dovegh	1520	SVD	6	
127.		Aygepar	1920	AK	2	
128.			2335		5	
129.		Eraskh	2210		4	
130.	17 April	Berqaber	0030	AK	20	
131.		Sarigyugh	0130		25	
132.		Aygepar	0300	AK	6	
133.			1345	PK	6	
134.		Chinari	1000	AK	300	
135.			1230	SVD	2	
136.				AK	4	
137.			1630	AK	7	

No	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of violations*
138.				SVD	3	
139.			1710	SVD	1	
140.				AK	7	
141.			1800	AK	2	
142.				PK	300	
143.			1815	AK	12	
144.		Barekamavan	1245	SVD	10	
145.			1340		10	
146.			1415		10	
147.			1530		20	
148.		Chambarak	1915	AK	3	
149.		Berdavan	2020	RPK	12	
150.		Paravaqar	2310	AK	1	
151.		Khndzorut	2310	SVD	1	
152.	18 April	Aygepar	1310	SVD	1	
153.			2010	PK	13	
154.		Paravaqar	1345	AK	1	
155.			1750		3	
156.		Berdavan	1640		3	
157.		N.Karmiraghbyur	1815		5	
158.		Khndzorut	2030-2050	AK	14	
159.				PK	7	
160.		Berqaber	2140	AK	3	
161.	19 April	Movses	1030	PK	7	
162.		Barekamavan	1520	SVD	3	
163.		Aygepar	2045	AK	1	
164.			2220		2	
165.		Eraskh	2305		3	
166.	20 April	Berdavan	0330	AK	10	
167.		Aygepar	1130		4	
168.			2350		2	

No	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of violations*
169.		N.Karmiraghbyur	1145	SVD	3	
170.		Paravaqar	1415	AK	5	
171.			1645	PK	5	
172.			1650	AK	10	
173.			2115		8	
174.		Movses	2325		14	
175.	21 April	Sarigyugh	1100	DSHK	12	
176.				PK	20	
177.			1130	SVD	4	
178.		Berdavan	1400	AK	100	
179.		Berqaber	1800	SVD	15	
180.		Vazashen	1900		2	
181.	22 April	Aygepar	0150	AK	4	
182.			0755		7	
183.			0930		1	
184.			0935	SVD	1	
185.		Movses	0210	PK	4	
186.			2340		1	
187.		Eraskh	0500	AK	2	
188.		Chinari	1250	RPK	10	
189.		N.Karmiraghbyur	2340	AK	30	
190.				DSHK	1	
191.	23 April	Berdavan	1600	DSHK	4	
192.		Voskepar	1645	AK	2	
193.		Khndzorut	2110	PK	27	
194.			2125	AK	8	
195.			2130	PK	7	
196.		Vazashen	2315	AK	6	
197.			2315		15	
198.	24 April	Chinari	0050	SVD	1	
199.				PK	15	

No.	Date	Direction	Time	Type of weapon	Ammunition	Results of violations
200.			1800	PK	9	
201.			1800	RPK	4	
202.		Berdavan	2030	AK	16	
203.			2040	PK	16	
204.			2100		40	
205.		Sarigyugh	2355	SVD	2	
206.				PK	25	
207.	25 April	Kiranc	0010	PK	15	
208.		Berqaber	1330	SVD	2	
209.			2040	AK	2	
210.		Chinari	1545		30	
211.		Movses	2000		2	
212.		Khachik	2330		3	
213.	26 April	Mehrab	1215	AK	1	
214.			1920	SVD	1	
215.		Baghanis	1530	AK	4	
216.			1540		7	
217.		Movses	1540		3	
218.		Aygepar	2040		10	
219.	27 April	Berdavan	0015	AK	5	
220.		Chinari	0340	AK	8	
221.				SVD	8	
222.			2030	PK	8	
223.			2030	AK	30	
224.		Berqaber	1315	SVD	2	
225.		Aygepar	1630	AK	2	
226.		Dovegh	2115		5	
227.			2135		17	
228.			2205		4	
229.			2215		60	
230.		Mehrab	2350	AK	4	

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of violations*
231.	28 April	Movses	0015	AK	8	
232.			1615	Black arrow	2	
233.		Dovegh	1145	AK	2	
234.			1455		3	
235.		Aygepar	1430	SVD	1	
236.		Chinari	1810	Black arrow	3	
237.				PK	10	
238.			2035	PK	7	
239.			2040	RPK	15	
240.			2305	Black arrow	8	
241.				PK	20	
242.				SVD	12	
243.				AK	40	
244.		Berdavan	1820	PK	4	
245.			2215	SVD	5	
246.	29 April	Chinari	0230	PK	20	
247.				SVD	10	
248.			2150	Black arrow	1	
249.				PK	25	
250.		Aygepar	0405	AK	1	
251.			0430		3	
252.		Berqaber	1110	Black arrow	2	
253.			1150		1	
254.		Dovegh	2050	AK	2	
255.		Eraskh	1650		3	
256.		Mehrab	1805	SVD	4	
257.		Voskepar	1855	AK	4	
258.			2205	SVD	5	
259.			2310	AK	20	
260.		Barekamavan	1945		2	
261.		Movses	2215		1	

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of violations*
262.			2245	AK	10	
263.		Sarigyugh	2300	PK	30	
264.				AK	30	
265.	30 April	Chinari	1930	DSHK	5	
266.				Black arrow	6	
267.		Dovegh	1540	PK	5	
268.				SVD	1	

United Nations A/68/895

General Assembly

Distr.: General
30 May 2014

Original: English

Sixty-eighth session
Agenda item 33 (b)
Prevention of armed conflict: strengthening the role of mediation in the peaceful settlement of disputes, conflict prevention and resolution

Letter dated 29 May 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith the statement of the International Election Observation Mission on the presidential elections in Ukraine (see annex), held on 25 May 2014.

I would be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 33 (b).

(*Signed*) Yuriy **Sergeyev**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

14-54364 (E) 060614

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 29 May 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION
Ukraine — Early Presidential Election, 25 May 2014

STATEMENT OF PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Kyiv, 26 May 2014 — This Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions is the result of a common endeavour involving the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR), the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA), the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), the European Parliament (EP) and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO PA).

João Soares (Portugal) was appointed by the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office as Special Coordinator to lead the short-term OSCE observer mission. Ilkka Kanerva (Finland) headed the OSCE PA delegation, Andreas Gross (Switzerland) led the PACE delegation, Göran Färm (Sweden) headed the EP delegation, and Karl A Lamers (Germany) led the NATO PA delegation. Tana de Zulueta (Italy) is the Head of the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission, deployed from 20 March 2014.

The assessment was made to determine whether the election complied with OSCE commitments and Council of Europe standards, as well as international obligations and domestic legislation. This Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions is delivered prior to the completion of the election process. The final assessment of the election will depend, in part, on the conduct of the remaining stages of the election process, including the tabulation of results, the handling of possible post-election day complaints and appeals. The OSCE/ODIHR will issue a comprehensive final report, including recommendations for potential improvements, some eight weeks after the completion of the election process. The OSCE PA will deliver its report to the Standing Committee on 28 June. The PACE will present its report during its Summer Session on 23-27 June 2014. The EP will present its report in its Committee on Foreign Affairs. The NATO PA delegation will present its report during the Assembly's Spring Session on 30 May-1 June.

PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS

The 25 May early presidential election in Ukraine was characterized by high voter turnout and the clear resolve of the authorities to hold what was a genuine election largely in line with international commitments and with a respect for fundamental freedoms in the vast majority of the country. This was despite the hostile security environment in two eastern regions and the increasing attempts to derail the process by armed groups in these parts of the country. The Central and other election commissions operated impartially and collegially on the whole, although a number of transparency issues arose just prior to election day and decisions taken may have been beyond their authority. The voting and counting process were transparent and largely in line with procedures, despite large queues of voters at polling stations in some parts of the country. The early stages of the tabulation process were evaluated

less positively by International Election Observation Mission (IEOM) observers mostly due to technical problems.

The election took place in a challenging political, economic and in particular security environment. Genuine efforts were made by the electoral authorities to conduct voting throughout the country, despite continued unrest and violence in the east of Ukraine, where anti-government forces control some areas, and the acting government is conducting counter-insurgency operations. This seriously impacted the election environment and affected the general human-rights situation there, also obstructing meaningful observation. The election did not take place on the Crimean peninsula, as it is not under the control of the Ukrainian authorities, and citizens residing there faced serious difficulties to participate in the election.

The legislative framework is adequate for the conduct of democratic elections. Numerous substantive changes were introduced to the legal framework during the election period, partly in an effort to address the rapidly changing political-security environment and ensure voting for those from the affected regions, and partly as a further step in the electoral reform process. While the changes resulted in a significantly different legal framework than the one in place when the election was called, most of the recent amendments were seen as necessary by election stakeholders.

Despite the challenging environment and limited lead time, the Central Election Commission (CEC) operated independently, impartially, collegially, and generally efficiently, and met all legal deadlines in the pre-election period. However, it did not adequately regulate a few aspects of the election, which lessened uniformity in the administration of the process. Candidate registration was largely inclusive and resulted in a field of 21 candidates.

Nominations of District Election Commission (DEC) and Precinct Election Commission (PEC) members by candidates, who may and did replace their nominees at will, affected the stability and efficiency of the election administration. However, most DECs and PECs, other than in Donetsk and Luhansk *oblasts* (regions), were able to overcome time constraints, frequent changes in their composition, and, on occasion, resource problems.

The situation in most parts of Donetsk and Luhansk *oblasts* significantly and adversely affected electoral preparations there. Serious problems in these *oblasts* included intrusion into and forced eviction and closure of DECs by armed groups, intimidation of election officials, including abductions, death threats, forced entry into private homes, seizure of equipment and election materials, and the shooting of a candidate proxy. These illegal actions constituted an attempt to prevent the election, deny citizens the fundamental right to freely participate and elect their chosen representative. IEOM commends the effort of those election officials who tried to continue with their work in spite of the enormous challenges they faced.

IEOM interlocutors voiced general confidence in the accuracy of the centralized State Voter Register (SVR). Voter lists were generally available for public scrutiny within the legal deadline. In parts of Donetsk and Luhansk *oblasts*, the CEC temporarily closed access to the SVR due to the so-called 11 May "referenda" to prevent abuse. Voter lists were produced with delays, or not at all in those two regions. A limited number of voters from the Crimean peninsula applied for a temporary transfer of their voting address to other parts of Ukraine.

The election campaign was subdued and overshadowed by political and security developments. It intensified only in the final weeks in most of the regions of the country. Most candidates were able to campaign without restrictions, except in the two eastern regions. However, there were a number of campaign-related incidents, including cases of intimidation and attacks on party and campaign offices, as well as instances where candidates were obstructed in their campaign.

As a positive development, the OSCE/ODIHR EOM observed no cases of misuse of administrative resources, and unlike in previous elections, interlocutors did not raise it as an issue of concern. The OSCE/ODIHR and the Council of Europe's Venice Commission have frequently stressed the need to improve campaign finance regulations to provide greater oversight and transparency. Despite recent amendments, these regulations should be further strengthened.

The media landscape is diverse, however, the lack of autonomy of the media from political or corporate interests often affects their editorial independence. Freedom of the media was severely undermined in the east, where journalists and media outlets faced threats and harassment throughout the campaign period. The overall public discourse in the broadcast media during the campaign period was dominated by the political and security crisis. Editorial coverage of candidates was limited and focused on a few contestants. In a welcome initiative, state television organized and broadcast debates among all candidates. Steps to stop certain channels from broadcasting alleged propaganda, while not directly impacting the election, were an unwelcome restriction. In line with the law, state media provided all candidates with free airtime and space. The adoption of a law transforming state television and radio into a public-service broadcaster is a welcome development. The introduction of this law was a long-standing OSCE/ODIHR recommendation.

Most national minority communities reported no substantial obstacles to their participation in the election process, with the notable exception of Crimean Tatars and Roma. There were incidents of violence and vandalism, unrelated to the election, against some communities. The debate about language policy was characterized by more flexible positions than in previous elections, although most of the candidates clearly disagreed on the issue of Russian as a second state language. Large parts of Ukraine's Russian-speaking community were affected by systematic disruption of the work of the election administration in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk *oblasts*.

The legislation provides equality between women and men in public and political life. There were 2 women among the 21 presidential candidates. Five of the 15 CEC members are women; they were almost equally represented on DECs and PECs.

The election law provides sufficient opportunities for an effective remedy of electoral disputes, although it sets out strict requirements for filing complaints and allows for rejection of complaints for minor deficiencies in format. The CEC received a limited number of complaints before election day but did not consider any on their merits due to formal deficiencies. The courts considered election disputes brought before them promptly and thoroughly. Recent legislative changes regarding the judiciary and the call for judicial lustration impacted the work of the courts during the election period.

The registration and accreditation of observers by the CEC was in general inclusive, with the Ukrainian authorities welcoming observers from all OSCE countries. Following recent amendments and in accordance with past OSCE/ODIHR

recommendations, Ukrainian citizen organizations may observe presidential elections, and all observers are now entitled to receive copies of results protocols at all levels of the election administration. However, deadlines for registration and accreditation of citizen observers to an extent limit their ability to effectively observe all stages of the election process.

In most of the country, election day took place peacefully. The CEC put voter turnout at 60 per cent. It started posting detailed preliminary election results by polling stations on its website on election night. Despite efforts of the election administration to ensure voting throughout the country, polling did not take place in large parts of Luhansk and Donetsk *oblasts*, due to systematic disruption by armed separatist groups. The voting and counting process was orderly and well organized in most of polling stations observed, with only minor procedural problems noted. However, the high number of voters frequently resulted in overcrowding, especially where local elections were held simultaneously, and frequently delayed the count in these polling stations. The early stages of the tabulation process were assessed negatively in a fifth of observations from IEOM observers, mainly due to working conditions, overcrowding, and an attack on the CEC's computer system that disrupted the processing and transmission of election results.

PRELIMINARY FINDINGS

Background

The early presidential election took place in a challenging political, economic and particularly security environment, which affected the legal framework, technical preparations and the campaigns of candidates.

The Maidan events starting in November 2013 and escalating in February brought about changes in the balance of power in parliament and the government composition, as well as the appointment of an acting president after Viktor Yanukovych fled the country. The so-called "referendum" of 16 March on the Crimean peninsula,[1] which was followed by the Russian Federation parliament's decision to include the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol as federal entities; this rendered the organization of the presidential election there impossible. In April, several administration buildings in Donetsk and Luhansk *oblast* (regions) were occupied, and a number of violent and fatal incidents have occurred in the east and south of Ukraine since then. The acting president launched a counter-insurgency operation on 14 April, which is continuing to date.

The control of the acting government has been further challenged following so-called "referenda" on autonomy/independence on 11 May, staged by self-proclaimed local "authorities" in some parts of Donetsk and Luhansk *oblast*.[2] These "referenda" were not observed by the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission (EOM) to any extent.

Together with the early presidential election, over 300 local elections (for mayor or council) took place, including for Kyiv city mayor and council. The OSCE/ODIHR

[1] The Council of Europe's Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) issued an opinion CDL-AD(2014)002, which stated that this "referendum" was unconstitutional and contrary to European standards.

[2] The Ukrainian authorities called these "referenda" illegal and illegitimate.

EOM only observed the local elections to the extent that they had an impact on the presidential election.

Legal Framework and Election System

The president of Ukraine is elected by popular vote for a five-year term. The same person may not serve as president for more than two consecutive terms. In case no candidate wins more than 50 per cent of the votes cast, a second round takes place three weeks after the first round, between the two candidates who won the most votes. On 16 May, the Constitutional Court issued a clarification that the presidential term for the extraordinary election on 25 May is five years.[3]

In February, parliament passed a law and related resolution on restoring provisions of the Constitution that were initially introduced in 2004 and were found to be unconstitutional on procedural grounds by the Constitutional Court in 2010.[4] Neither the law nor the resolution were considered by parliament as amendments to the Constitution and therefore the special procedures for amending the Constitution were not followed. To date, the recent changes were not appealed. The work of the special commission appointed by parliament in March to draft amendments to the Constitution continues and proposed drafts, including on the powers of the president, are expected after the election.

The entire legal framework for the presidential election underwent several substantive changes in the three months prior to the election. The primary legal framework is comprised of the Constitution and the Law on Election of the President of Ukraine (hereinafter, the election law), the Law on the Central Election Commission (CEC) and the Law on the State Voter Register, all of which were amended. While changes in legislation were widely accepted as necessary and welcomed by election stakeholders, the changes resulted in a significantly different legal framework than the one in place when the election was called.[5]

The election law alone was amended six times in 2014.[6] Some of the amendments were to make the early election on 25 May feasible, facilitate concurrent local elections, and to react to the needs of the current context.[7] However, the March

[3] On 22 April, 101 members of parliament submitted a request for clarification on two contradicting provisions in the Constitution, Article 103 that states the presidential term is five years and the transitional provisions that says the next regularly scheduled election will be in March 2015.

[4] Decision of the Constitutional Court No. 20-rp/2010, dated 30 September 2010 (case No. 1-45/2010).

[5] Previous OSCE/ODIHR reports on elections in Ukraine have criticized changes in election legislation shortly prior to an election as contrary to international good practice and potentially confusing for participants. As well, the Venice Commission's Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters recommends not modifying key aspects of the electoral legislation within a year prior to an election (point II.2.65). All reports are available at: http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine.

[6] 28 February, 13 March, 8 April, 6 May, 15 May, and 20 May.

[7] The 6 May amendments reduced the minimum number of Precinct Election Commission members from 12 to 9, to address a shortfall in nominations by presidential candidates. These amendments were submitted and adopted immediately prior to the deadline for PEC formation. Amendments on 15 May addressed the role of executive bodies in ensuring the organization and security of the elections and permit the movement of DECs in emergency situations. Finally, 20 May amendments prescribed the destruction of undeliverable ballots and permitted the addition of military personnel serving in Donetsk and Luhansk to the voter list on election day.

amendments were part of larger efforts for electoral reform aimed at harmonizing the law with the recently amended parliamentary election law and addressing outstanding recommendations previously made by the OSCE/ODIHR and the Council of Europe's Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission). Explicit language was added to the election law as part of March amendments obliging the establishment of results regardless of the number of polling stations where elections were held. Throughout the pre-election period, numerous proposals for legislation to address the conduct of the election in the changing political-security environment and access to the polls for citizens from the Crimean peninsula were considered by parliament.[8] Even though procedures allowing voters from the Crimean peninsula to vote elsewhere were relaxed, they remained onerous in practice.

The Constitution provides for equality between women and men in public and political life. In addition, the Law on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men specifically provides for equal rights and opportunities in the election process.

Election Administration

The election is administered by the CEC; 213 District Election Commissions (DECs); and 32,244 Precinct Election Commissions (PECs). The CEC is a permanent institution. The CEC forms DECs, and DECs form PECs. DEC and PEC members are nominated by candidates.[9] Legal amendments that shortened the timeframe to form DECs and PECs increased the organizational challenges.

Among other things, the CEC has the task to ensure the implementation and protection of citizens' electoral rights, which in practice can only be achieved with the full cooperation of other state institutions at all levels. The situation in the east of Ukraine seriously challenged the election administration's ability to fulfil this responsibility. No elections were organized on the Crimean peninsula as it is not under the control of the Ukrainian authorities, and citizens residing there faced serious difficulties in participating in the election, partly caused by legal provisions.

Despite the challenging environment and limited lead time, the CEC operated independently, impartially, and collegially, and generally efficiently, meeting all legal deadlines. Between 25 February and 24 May, the CEC adopted some 700 decisions (resolutions) on a wide variety of issues. However, a few aspects of the election were not adequately regulated by the CEC, which lessened uniformity in the administration of the process.[10] Almost all CEC resolutions were adopted unanimously.

---

[8] On 15 April, parliament passed the Law on Ensuring the Rights and Freedoms of Citizens and the Legal Order on the Temporary Occupied Territory of Ukraine. In addition to addressing many key legal questions, the law also states that voting will not take place on the Crimean peninsula and relaxes procedures for citizens from these territories to register to vote in other parts of Ukraine.

[9] A higher-level commission may appoint members if nominations are below the minimum commission size.

[10] For example, the CEC did not regulate the mechanism to redistribute DEC executives among the candidates after a candidate withdrawal; the methods for DECs to allocate executive positions in the PECs among nominees, and how appointees are found where candidates (combined) nominate less than the legal minimum number of members on DECs and PECs.

The CEC conducted its work in a transparent manner. Its sessions were open to candidates and their representatives, who were able to address the commission, as well as media and accredited observers. As in previous elections, the CEC held unannounced "preparatory" meetings prior to sessions. The CEC recently amended its Rules of Procedures to allow invited persons to attend its "preparatory" meetings. The CEC publishes all its decisions and other information on its website, and made a significant effort to publish thousands of DEC decisions. Training was provided for DEC and PEC executives. Most OSCE/ODIHR EOM observers assessed the training to be of good quality.

The law requires that DEC and PEC chairpersons, deputy chairpersons and secretaries (executive positions) are allocated to candidates in proportion to the number of nominations submitted. The CEC formed DECs within the legal deadline and appointed their executives according to the "proportionality principle". As during previous elections, subsequently many candidates replaced high numbers of their appointees, including executives.[11] This increased the CEC's workload and negatively affected the election administration's functioning.[12] The withdrawal of candidates Nataliya Korolevska and Oleh Tsariov necessitated the subsequent reallocation of 56 DEC executives. In selecting replacements, the CEC prioritized electoral experience. Consequently, after the reallocation some candidates had a slightly higher proportion of DEC executives than others.[13]

OSCE/ODIHR EOM observers reported that initially, a significant minority of DECs faced various impediments to their work, including with resourcing. In the run-up to the election, the situation in most districts improved. However, the political environment, general lack of security and counter-insurgency operations in large parts of Donetsk and Luhansk *oblasts* significantly and adversely affected electoral preparations there. The situation deteriorated after 11 May. Serious problems in these *oblasts* included the eviction and closure of DECs by armed groups, seizing of DEC equipment and election materials and intimidation of DEC and PEC members and candidate proxies, including abduction, forced entry into private homes and shooting of a candidate proxy.[14] This deterred citizens from serving as election commissioners and seriously impeded electoral preparations.[15] Nevertheless, IEOM observers stressed the determination of many election officials in these *oblasts* to overcome the serious challenges.

The CEC established 32,244 electoral precincts. OSCE/ODIHR EOM observers reported that over half of DECs experienced difficulties in appointing PECs by the

[11] By 23 May, some 43 per cent of DEC members had been replaced; some on multiple occasions.

[12] The CEC also handled aspects of the local elections and a parliamentary by-election that were held on 25 May.

[13] Notably Petro Poroshenko, Mykhaylo Dobkin, Yulia Tymoshenko, and Zoryan Shkiryak, whose representation among the executives rose by between 30 to 16 per cent. Anatoliy Hrytsenko challenged the CEC's reallocation of DEC executive positions. The CEC decision was upheld; however, the courts noted that the legal obligation to ensure proportional allocation applies when filling vacated posts and not only upon formation of the DEC.

[14] The OSCE/ODIHR EOM observers were informed by the candidate's head of campaign.

[15] In its resolutions No. 505 and 617 the CEC called on the parliament, the government and other authorities to provide proper security for the work of election commissions. The citizen observer group Committee of Voters of Ukraine urged the authorities to provide security for voters and election commission members, detailing the difficulties being faced by them, see at http://svsever.lg.ua/2014/05/zayavlenie-loo-kiu-chlenyi-izbiratelnyih-komissiy-ne-dolzhnyi-byit-pushechnyim-myasom-v-borbe-kievskoy-vlasti-s-luganskimi-separatistami/.

6 May legal deadline, largely due to some candidates not submitting nominations or submitting an insufficient number. DECs employed various solutions to make up a shortfall. This lack of uniformity might have influenced the pluralism of some PECs.[16] DECs used a variety of methods to allocate the PEC executive positions, including lotteries, although they achieved a proportional allocation among the candidates. The majority of DECs formed all PECs by the deadline, with the remainder formed with a slight delay. Candidates replaced many of their PEC members, causing DECs and PECs operational difficulties. However, many DECs in Donetsk and Luhansk *oblasts* experienced more serious difficulties, struggling to form PECs according to the legal provisions, such as mass resignations primarily caused by a fear of serving as PEC members in an unsecure environment. On election day, the reduction in the minimum size of PECs from 12 to 9 members did cause operational problems, particularly where local elections were held simultaneously.

Five of the 15 CEC members are women, including one deputy chairperson and the secretary. Men and women are almost equally represented on DECs, including chairpersons; OSCE/ODIHR EOM LTOs reported a higher proportion of women serving as DEC secretaries (some 68 per cent).

Voter Registration

Voters are registered automatically in the centralized State Voter Register (SVR). The CEC supervises the work of the central SVR office, 27 Registration Administration Bodies (RABs) and 756 Register Maintenance Bodies (RMBs), which continuously update and maintain the register. Since 2013, voters can check their records online, thereby enhancing transparency.[17] According to official data, as of 21 May, 35,906,852 voters were registered to vote, of which 55 per cent are women. Some 666,990 homebound voters were registered to vote at their place of stay, and 472,058 voters were registered to vote abroad.[18]

IEOM interlocutors voiced general confidence in the accuracy of the voter register. Due to the situation in eastern Ukraine, in early May the CEC temporarily closed access to the SVR database for some 40 RMBs in Donetsk and Luhansk *oblasts*, to prevent abuse.[19] Consequently, the preliminary voter lists of some 1,500 PECs (out of 3,907 in these *oblasts*) were not printed and distributed within the legal deadline then in effect.[20] Access to the SVR for all but 13 of these RMBs was restored.[21] OSCE/ODIHR EOM observers reported that almost all PECs for which handover was observed received the preliminary voter lists within or shortly after the deadline.[22] In Donetsk and Luhansk *oblasts*, the handover of voter lists could not be observed by OSCE/ODIHR EOM observers due to the security situation; the CEC reported that only 32 and 25 per cent of PECs these regions respectively were able

[16] After the March amendments, PECs must have at least 12 members; the last change reduced it to 9 members.

[17] Some 108,000 voters used this facility from 25 February to May 20.

[18] According to CEC Resolution No. 484, 114 PECs were established in 75 countries.

[19] The actual number of RMBs whose access was blocked varied from day to day.

[20] According to March amendments the preliminary voter lists had to be delivered to PECs 16 days before election day. This deadline was shortened to 8 days prior to election day, after the 15 May amendments.

[21] Access to the SVR for these RMBs remains blocked as their premises remain occupied. These RMBs are responsible for the records of some 288,000 voters.

[22] OSCE/ODIHR EOM LTOs observed the handover of voter lists to PECs at 109 RMBs.

to receive them. According to the SVR office, voter lists were seized from two RMBs in the two eastern *oblasts*.[23]

Following amendments to the election law, voters can no longer register on election day.[24] The CEC has sought to raise awareness of legal provisions that allow all Ukrainian voters, including those residing on the Crimean peninsula, to change their voting location on a temporary basis without changing their residence.[25] In practice, however, OSCE/ODIHR observed differing and inconsistent application of this provision, and voter education in general appeared to be insufficient. As of 21 May, some 171,000 voters requested to temporarily change their voting address, including some 6,000 residents of the Crimean peninsula.[26]

Candidate Registration

A Ukrainian citizen is eligible for the presidency if he or she is older than 35, has the right to vote, has resided in Ukraine for at least 10 years prior to election day, and has command of the state language.[27] These residency requirements appear at odds with international standards.[28] A provision that a presidential candidate must not have been convicted of an intentional crime has been removed from the law, in line with previous OSCE/ODIHR and Venice Commission recommendations.[29] Candidates can be nominated by a party or through self-nomination.

In order to be registered, each prospective candidate had to submit a comprehensive set of documents together with a document certifying that a deposit of UAH 2.5 million (around EUR 178,000 at the time of registration) had been paid into a special CEC bank account. This sum is only returned to rejected nominees and the two candidates who qualify for a second round.[30]

---

[23] On 15 May, voter lists were seized by armed people from Kyivski district RMB in Donetsk and Zhovtnevyi district RMB in Luhansk.

[24] On 20 May the law was amended allowing the military personnel serving in Donetsk and Luhansk *oblasts* to be added to the voter lists on election day.

[25] Requests for temporary changes of voting address must be filed no later than 5 days before election day and must be justified. However, the law does not specify what can be considered as justification. Voters whose voting address is on the Crimean peninsula do not need any justification apart from their ID.

[26] The total number of voters registered on the Crimean peninsula was 1,806,361.

[27] The legislation does not elaborate how, if at all, a candidate's command of the state language is assessed. In addition, the Venice Commission's Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters, point I 1.1 c iii-iv: iii. states that "a length of residence requirement may be imposed on nationals solely for local or regional elections; iv. the requisite period of residence should not exceed six months; a longer period may be required only to protect national minorities".

[28] "Persons who are otherwise eligible to stand for election should not be excluded by unreasonable or discriminatory requirements such as education, residence or descent, or by reason of political affiliation". See Paragraph 14 of General Comment No. 25 (1996) to Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) by the UN Human Rights Committee. See also OSCE/ODIHR and Venice Commission Joint Opinion CDL-AD(2009)040.

[29] See judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in *Scoppola v. Italy* (No. 3), 22 May 2012 and *Hirst v. the United Kingdom* (No. 2), 6 October 2005.

[30] The OSCE/ODIHR in its Final Report on the 2010 presidential election recommended: "Reducing of the financial deposit required for a candidate to register and the threshold of votes needed for a refund of that deposit should be considered." The law is silent about the return of deposits if there is only one round. Ibid. CDL-AD(2009)040, para 17.

The CEC registered the candidates in accordance with the legal provisions and in a largely inclusive manner. It received 46 candidate applications by the legal deadline, registering 23 candidates — of whom 7 were nominated by parties — and rejecting 23 applicants. All of the rejected candidates had material errors in their applications.[31] Twenty-two had failed to pay the deposit, while the CEC decided that the other nominee's application had not complied with the documentation requirements and other provisions of the law.[32] A total of 16 appeals were filed by 11 of the rejected applicants with the courts. All CEC decisions were upheld on appeal.

Two candidates withdrew from the election by the legal deadline. The 21-candidate field,[33] which included two women, offered voters a wide choice between candidates representing diverse political views.

The Campaign Environment and Campaign Finance

The presidential campaign has been subdued overall and has been overshadowed by the recent political and security developments. It intensified only in the final weeks in most of the country.

Only nine candidates had a visible campaign with billboards, posters, newspapers, tents and, to a lesser extent, rallies and door-to-door canvassing. Some candidates declared that they were conducting a less prominent campaign, to demonstrate modesty given the dire economic and security situation in the country, or due to a lack of resources. Most candidates were able to campaign freely and without restriction, except in the eastern regions.[34] However, some candidates faced obstruction and difficulties, and some decided to limit their campaign or did not campaign in person due to security reasons. Four candidates, who had conducted limited or no campaign activities, announced in the media, after the legal deadline, that they were withdrawing from the presidential race.[35]

In total, out of 114 rallies observed by the OSCE/ODIHR EOM, 100 were held by five candidates, predominantly in the western and central regions.[36] The contenders promoted a range of issues, including security, stability and unity of the country, decentralization, constitutional reform, language policy, reform of the armed forces,

[31] In line with the previous OSCE/ODIHR and Venice Commission recommendations, the amended law provides nominees with the opportunity to correct technical errors and inaccuracies in submitted documents. Ibid. CDL-AD(2013)006, para 60.

[32] The CEC closely scrutinized the application of Darth O. Vader. It decided that his supporting documents and his electoral programme did not comply with the legal requirements and referred the matter to the prosecutor regarding potentially falsified documents.

[33] Olha Bohomolets, Yuriy Boyko, Andriy Hrynenko, Anatoliy Hrytsenko, Mykhailo Dobkin, Oleksandr Klymenko, Valery Konovalyuk, Renat Kuzmin, Vasil Kuybida, Oleh Lyashko, Mykola Malomuzh, Petro Poroshenko, Vadym Rabynovich, Volodymyr Saranov, Petro Symonenko, Yulia Tymoshenko, Serhiy Tihipko, Oleh Tyahnybok, Vasyl Tsushko, Zoryan Shkiryak and Dmitro Yarosh.

[34] Sixteen of the 21 candidates stressed that the security situation had a negative impact on their ability to campaign in Donetsk, Luhansk and Kharkiv *oblasts*.

[35] Zoryan Shkiryak, Petro Symonenko and Oleksandr Klymenko; the latter announced that he was withdrawing in favour of Petro Poroshenko. However, these candidates remained on the ballot paper; there is no provision of removing them from the ballots.

[36] Petro Poroshenko — 32 rallies, Oleh Tyahnybok — 30 rallies, Yulia Tymoshenko — 18 rallies, Anatoliy Hrytsenko and Oleh Lyashko — 10 each.

the fight against corruption and oligarchy, as well as relations with the European Union, NATO and the Russian Federation. Militant rhetoric towards anti-government groups and the Russian Federation was used by some candidates, while campaigning.

The OSCE/ODIHR EOM observed a number of violent incidents during the campaign period. Several cases of intimidation and attacks on political party and campaign offices across the country were reported by OSCE/ODIHR EOM LTOs.[37] OSCE/ODIHR EOM LTOs reported that three candidates were obstructed in their campaign.[38] In Luhansk *oblast*, campaign tents and staff of some candidates were attacked or threatened.[39] As a positive development the OSCE/ODIHR EOM observed no cases of misuse of administrative resources, and unlike in previous elections, interlocutors did not raise it as an issue of concern. There are no effective enforcement mechanisms in legislation that would address campaign violations.[40]

The election law does not limit campaign expenses. While voluntary contributions by individuals to a candidate's campaign are limited, the funds a candidate or the nominating party can contribute to a presidential campaign are not limited. There is no requirement for candidates to report on their campaign finances before election day. The numerous amendments to the election law adopted in 2014 did not address previous OSCE/ODIHR and Venice Commission recommendations on campaign-financing issues. Furthermore, the law continues to give an advantage to candidates nominated by political parties.[41]

The Media

The media landscape is diverse and comprises a large number of state and private broadcast, print and online outlets; however, the lack of autonomy of the media from political or corporate interests often affects their editorial independence. The main source of public information is television, but Internet is increasing in importance and offers a wide range of views. The state-owned broadcaster will be transformed into a public service broadcaster by the Law on Public Television and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine.[42] The introduction of this law was a long-standing OSCE/ODIHR recommendation.

The media legislation generally provides a sound framework for freedom of the media. However, freedom of the media was a major concern throughout the

[37] Communist Party offices in Kyiv, as well as in Rivne, Zakarpattya, Vinnytsia, Dnipropetrovsk and Ternopil *oblasts*; Party of Regions offices in Chernivtsi and Chernihiv *oblasts*. *Batkivshchyna* reported attacks or threats in Kyiv, Lviv and Odessa *oblasts*; campaign offices of Petro Poroshenko were attacked in Donetsk and Cherkassy *oblasts*.

[38] Mr. Dobkin in Dnipropetrovsk, Kyiv and Kherson *oblasts*; Mr. Hrytsenko in Poltava *oblast*; Mr. Tihipko in Luhansk *oblast*. Mr. Dobkin's proxy informed the OSCE/ODIHR EOM that two appeals had been submitted to the Prosecutor General over several such cases.

[39] Mr. Hrytsenko, Mr. Poroshenko, and Ms. Tymoshenko, according to reports by OSCE/ODIHR EOM LTOs.

[40] The CEC or DEC is to send the claim or complaint to the relevant enforcement body for investigation and further action.

[41] This is not in line with the Venice Commission's Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters, I.2.3, available at: http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2002)023-e. Ibid. CDL-AD(2009)040, paras. 48-53.

[42] The law was adopted by parliament on 17 April and signed by the interim president on 13 May. However, due to transitory provisions, the law is not likely to be effectively enforced until 2015.

pre-election period. Journalists and media operating in the south and east of Ukraine faced constant and severe threats and harassment.[43] A temporary ban on four Russian TV channels was enacted on 25 March that was not uniformly respected.[44] Steps to stop certain channels from broadcasting alleged propaganda, while not directly impacting the election, were an unwelcome restriction.

The conduct of the media during the election campaign is regulated by the election law, which stipulates that both state and private media shall offer balanced coverage and provide contestants with equal conditions. State national television and radio abided by the election law by offering free airtime to all contestants. Candidates availed themselves of this opportunity and also made use of the free space provided by two state-owned newspapers. The National Television and Radio Broadcasting Council (NTRBC) supervised the media's compliance with existing laws during the election campaign.[45] Yet, the NTRBC's capacity to fully ensure compliance of the media with the law is limited by an unclear system of sanctions.[46]

OSCE/ODIHR EOM media monitoring showed that during the election campaign, the overall political discourse in the media was dominated by the crisis in the southern and eastern regions, including when candidates were directly covered.[47] Broadcast media covered the campaign in a variety of formats but focused their editorial coverage on a limited number of contestants.[48] The state-owned *First Channel*, in a positive initiative, organized and broadcast "National Debates" among all candidates.[49]

In state TV's news coverage, however, the campaign was very limited. *First Channel* devoted 59 per cent of its airtime to covering the work of state institutions, and only 11 per cent to the candidates. The most popular talk show on *First Channel*, "Shuster Live", provided Ms. Tymoshenko with 29 per cent of its coverage.[50] Mr. Poroshenko was invited to participate in debates with Ms. Tymoshenko on this talk show, but he declined. The tone of coverage on private broadcasters was generally neutral, but in a few cases the airtime allocated appeared biased. For

[43] The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media closely followed the deterioration of the media's capacity to freely operate in the country and issued several statements calling for a restoration of the freedom of the media. See: http://www.osce.org/fom/118990.

[44] The temporary ban, requested by the National Television and Radio Broadcasting Council who claimed the channels were airing broadcasts that incite hatred, was imposed by Decision No. 824/3456/14 of the Kyiv District Administrative Court, which will be in force until a final decision of the court on the merits.

[45] The NTRBC's election-related activities included a media-monitoring component. The NTRBC informed the OSCE/ODIHR EOM that it notified broadcasting companies and the CEC on detected violations. A public report will be issued only after the election.

[46] The NTRBC informed the OSCE/ODIHR EOM that its capacity is currently limited to issuing warnings, which it does by notifying broadcasting companies and the CEC about detected violations.

[47] The OSCE/ODIHR EOM on 1 April commenced a media monitoring of seven TV channels (state-owned *First Channel* and private channels *Inter*, *5 Channel*, *ICTV*, *1+1*, *TVi*, *TRK Ukraina*), and of 2 newspapers (state-owned *Holos Ukrainy* and private *Fakty i Kommentarii*).

[48] Mr. Poroshenko and Ms. Tymoshenko obtaining both 20 per cent, Mr. Dobkin 9 per cent, Mr. Tihipko 9 per cent, and Mr. Lyashko 8 per cent of the coverage.

[49] All candidates participated in these debates.

[50] "Shuster Live" constituted 70 per cent of all political coverage on *First Channel*, outside of free airtime and "National Debates".

instance, *5 Channel* gave 60 per cent of its editorial coverage to Mr. Poroshenko.[51] Not many candidates invested in paid advertisement for their campaign. Four candidates purchased 82 per cent of all total paid advertising in the TV channels monitored, with Mr. Poroshenko alone having purchased 33 per cent.[52] Print media offered a limited coverage of the campaign; instances of articles with features of paid material not clearly marked as such were observed. During the last two weeks of the campaign, state and private TV channels broadcast messages from the CEC and voter education spots.

Participation of National Minorities

According to the 2001 census,[53] 77.8 per cent of citizens of Ukraine are ethnic Ukrainians, 17.3 per cent are ethnic Russians and the remaining 5 per cent comprise Belarusians, Bulgarians, Crimean Tatars, Jews, Hungarians, Moldovans, Poles, Roma, Romanians, and other small minority groups. Twenty-nine per cent of the population consider Russian as their native language.

Most national minority communities throughout the country told the OSCE/ ODIHR EOM that they expected their members to vote and reported no substantial obstacles to their participation in the election process as voters or candidates.[54] Campaign rhetoric was observed to be tolerant towards national minorities.

While most candidates did not reach out to the minority vote in particular, the debate about language policy was characterized by more flexible positions than in past campaigns. Most candidates agreed that the Russian language should have greater status or, at the very least, that the 2012 language law should remain in force. However, they still clearly disagreed on the question of a second state language. Parliament's decision (later suspended) to repeal the language law in February 2014 continued to worry some minorities, who cited language policy as their primary campaign issue. They did not, however, report that the conduct of the election in the state language only created a barrier to their understanding of election materials or debates. An exception was the Roma community, who acknowledged a limited understanding of the state language for some members and reported exclusion from the election process more generally due to a lack of identity documents.

The prevention of polling in certain districts in Donetsk and Luhansk *oblast* disproportionally affected Ukraine's Russian-speaking community, over one-third of which lives in these *oblasts*. Incidents of violence, intimidation and vandalism against some communities, including Jewish and Roma, contributed to an atmosphere of uncertainty for minorities in various areas in the country. Crimean Tatars and other minorities on the Crimean peninsula, like other residents from Crimea, voted in significantly reduced numbers.[55]

---

[51] *5 Channel* is owned by Mr. Poroshenko.

[52] Other three candidates were Ms. Tymoshenko, 20 per cent, Mr. Dobkin, 15 per cent, and Mr. Tihipko 14 per cent.

[53] The next census was originally scheduled for 2011, but has been postponed to 2016.

[54] The OSCE/ODIHR EOM has interviewed 94 representatives from 20 ethnic minority groups and 7 religious communities across the country, as well as 6 consultative bodies representing minorities.

[55] Based on census figures, 243,400 Crimean Tatars resided on the Crimean peninsula as of 2001. The Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People estimates their current population to be 300,000. However, only some 6,000 of the approximately 1.8 million voters from Crimea re-registered temporarily to vote elsewhere.

Complaints and Appeals

The right to an effective remedy is sufficiently guaranteed in the election law; however, the election law still allows for the rejection of complaints based on minor deficiencies in format.[56] The right to appeal decisions, actions or inactions of election commissions and other actors involved in the process is granted to all participants in the election process.[57] For the majority of election-related matters, complainants can file their complaint with the election administration or the courts, or with both. Election-related complaints and appeals are heard by administrative courts; the High Administrative Court is the court of last instance for election-related matters.

In the consideration of election-related complaints and appeals, the courts adhered to the two-day deadline for review and offered complainants a sufficient opportunity to state their claim. Additionally, courts thoroughly questioned the CEC's arguments and demanded additional documentation from the CEC when necessary to adjudicate the matter. A total of 29 cases were reviewed by the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeals, of which 17 were subsequently appealed to the High Administrative Court.[58]

The CEC received 16 complaints in the pre-election period but did not consider the merits of any of the complaints received.[59] Complaints were answered with letters explaining the formal deficiencies of the complaint in accordance with the election law. No further efforts were made by the CEC to consider the questions raised in the complaints on its own initiative.

Although not directly affecting the adjudication of election-related disputes, recent legislative developments dismissing constitutional and high administrative court judges, changing the competency of the courts, increasing parliament's role in judicial appointments, and calling for the lustration of sitting judges impacted the work of the judiciary in the election period. Further, the expressed hesitation of some judges to adjudicate election-related disputes and freedom of assembly cases

[56] Article 95 of the election law sets out the requirements for complaints filed with the election commission and the courts, including *inter alia*: a list of attachments to the complaint, personal details of the subject of the complaint even if not known, multiple copies of all the documents attached, notarized copy of authority as a proxy or candidate representative even if already registered as such with the CEC.

[57] Presidential candidates, parties that are participating in the election process, election commissions, domestic observers, as well as voters whose rights were violated can file complaints and appeal decisions.

[58] The 29 cases included 16 appeals of CEC decisions regarding registration of 11 candidates, 1 challenge from a rejected candidate to the registration of Petro Poroshenko, 2 complaints from a presidential candidate regarding statements in the media made by other candidates, 1 appeal of the CEC's reallocation of DEC executive positions amongst candidates, 3 appeals regarding a citizen's request for the CEC to provide the personal history statements of the presidential candidates, 3 from a citizen about the program of Yulia Tymoshenko, 1 request from a citizen to change the ballot type, and 2 appeals related to the accreditation of international observers. Two additional complaints were reviewed by local courts in Chernihiv and Kyiv regarding misleading information in the media about candidates and party members.

[59] One complaint from candidate Vadym Rabinovych about the presidential orders for state security for six of the presidential candidates was discussed in a CEC session where the decision was taken that it is not within the CEC's jurisdiction to review the actions of the president.

for fear of future repercussions raises concern, as does the political interference in the election of a Chief Justice for the High Administrative Court.[60]

Citizen and International Observers

The process of registration and accreditation of observers by the CEC was in general inclusive, with the Ukrainian authorities welcoming observers from all OSCE countries.[61] Following the amendments to the election law, citizen organizations have the right to observe the elections. The law requires that in order to be eligible to observe the election, civic organizations' charters must stipulate election observation as one of the organization's activities, thereby narrowing the opportunity to observe. In addition, a 60-day deadline for the civic organization to be registered as eligible to nominate observers, might significantly limit the possibility of civic organizations to observe the elections. In total, 10 civic organizations were permitted to accredit observers. The largest groups, *OPORA* and the Committee of Voters of Ukraine (CVU) conducted long-term and short-term observation and published several reports before election day.

In line with previous OSCE/ODIHR recommendations, all observers are now granted the right to receive copies of results protocols at all levels of the election administration, which is an important element to increase transparency. Furthermore, all national observers are entitled to file complaints.

Election Day

In most of the country, election day took place peacefully overall. The CEC put voter turnout at 60 per cent. It started posting detailed preliminary election results by polling stations on its website at around 01:30 a.m. but faced technical problems doing so.

Despite efforts of the election administration to ensure voting throughout the country, polling did not take place in 10 of the 12 election districts in Luhansk *oblast* and 14 of the 22 election districts in Donetsk *oblast*.[62] This was due to illegal actions by armed separatist groups before and on election day, including death threats and intimidation of election officials, seizure and destruction of polling materials, as well as the impossibility to distribute ballots to polling stations due to general insecurity caused by these groups. The majority of Ukrainian citizens resident in these *oblasts* were thus deprived of the opportunity to vote and to express their will. Elsewhere, only a few isolated attempts to disrupt voting were reported.

---

[60] On 17 April, the scheduled election of the Chief Justice of the High Administrative Court was interrupted by approximately 200 protestors who demanded that two of the three judicial candidates not be considered. An agreement was reached with Right Sector and a *Batkivshchyna* member of parliament that the court would share the list of judges running prior to re-scheduling the election.

[61] According to the CEC, around 3,000 international observers from 19 foreign states and 20 international organizations were accredited. The registration of one international organization was rejected on the grounds not envisaged by the election law, this decision was reversed by the court ruling.

[62] The CEC reported that voting did take place in over 800 of the 3,908 polling stations in these *oblasts*, in election districts 47, 49, 50, 58, 59, 60, 61 and 62 in Donetsk *oblast*, and in election districts 114 and 115 in Luhansk *oblast*. However, turnout in these regions was below average, due to the insecure environment.

Opening procedures were assessed positively in all but 16 of the 342 polling stations where opening was observed, although IEOM observers noted some minor procedural problems, including isolated cases of ballot boxes not being sealed properly, and small delays in opening for voting.

Voting was assessed positively in 98 per cent of polling stations observed, and with a somewhat less positive assessment where local elections were also held (94 per cent positive), including Kyiv (95 per cent). Outside the capital, there were no significant regional variations. Circumstances in and around polling stations were assessed positively overall, although overcrowding was reported from 11 per cent of polling stations observed, and large groups of people waiting outside to vote in 6 per cent. IEOM observers noted organizational problems in 6 per cent of polling station observed, mainly due to inadequate layout or poor queue control. They reported only a few isolated cases of tension, intimidation or obstruction. Almost one half of polling stations observed was not readily accessible for people with disabilities, and the layout of one quarter was not adequate for disabled voters.

Voting procedures were followed in the large majority of polling stations observed. The main problem reported by IEOM observers was that in 4 per cent of polling stations observed, not all voters marked their ballots in secrecy. In 3 per cent, ballot boxes were not properly sealed. Apart from group voting (4 per cent), only isolated cases of more serious procedural violations were observed. Voter identification procedures were adhered to in almost all polling stations observed; however, in 25 per cent of polling stations observed, small numbers of voters were turned away, usually because their names could not be found on the voter list or because they could not produce a valid identity document. Official complaints were filed in at least 4 per cent of polling stations observed.

Unauthorized people were present in 9 per cent of polling stations observed, and seen interfering in or directing the process in 2 per cent. Candidate observers or proxies were present in 95 per cent of polling stations observed, mainly for candidates Poroshenko (82 per cent) and Tymoshenko (81 per cent), while citizen observers were present in 24 per cent. In polling stations observed by IEOM observers, 66 per cent of PEC chairpersons were women; overall, women accounted for 71 per cent of PEC members in these polling stations.

The vote count was assessed positively in 95 per cent of the 363 polling stations where it was observed. Candidate observers and proxies were present at 95 per cent of counts observed, and citizen observers at 20 per cent. Unauthorized people were present at 9 per cent of counts observed, often interfering in or directing the process. IEOM observers reported some procedural errors and problems during the count. In 17 per cent of counts, PECs had problems completing the results protocol, and 20 per cent had to revise figures established earlier. IEOM observers noted 30 cases of pre-signed results protocols.

The early stages of the tabulation process were assessed negatively in 52 of 300 observations submitted by IEOM observers. Premises and conditions were not adequate in many DECs, which at times affected proper observation. Many IEOM observers reported overcrowding (70 reports) and tension (61 reports).

On election night, the CEC informed the IEOM that the communications network linking the DECs to the CEC's informatics system "*Vybory*" was not working due to

a cyber-attack.[63] This caused a major disruption to the receipt and processing of election material, prevented many DECs from transmitting election results to the CEC, and delayed the CEC's announcement of preliminary results. DECs responded to the problem in different ways: some manually tabulated vote totals; some entered this data into the *Vybory* system and sent screenshots to the CEC, while others temporarily suspended their activity.

The English version is the only official document.
However, this statement is also available in Ukrainian and Russian.

MISSION INFORMATION & ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission opened in Kyiv on 20 March, with 24 experts in the capital, and with 100 long-term observers deployed throughout Ukraine.

On election day, over 1,200 observers from 49 countries were deployed, including 1,025 long-term and short-term observers deployed by the OSCE/ODIHR, as well as a 116-member delegation from the OSCE PA, a 46-member delegation from the PACE, a 18-member delegation from the NATO PA, and a 14-member delegation from the EP. Voting was observed in over 4,050 polling stations out of a total of 32,244. Counting was observed in some 360 polling stations across 162 election districts. IEOM observers reported from 151 out of 213 DECs.

The observers wish to thank the authorities of Ukraine for the invitation to observe the election, the Central Election Commission for its cooperation and for providing accreditation documents, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other authorities for their assistance and cooperation. The observers also wish to express appreciation to the OSCE Project Coordinator in Ukraine, the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine and embassies and international organizations accredited in Ukraine for their cooperation and support.

For further information, please contact:

- Ms. Tana de Zulueta, Head of the OSCE/ODIHR EOM, in Kyiv (+38 0 44 498 1900);
- Mr. Thomas Rymer, OSCE/ODIHR Spokesperson (+48 609 522 266); or Ms. Lusine Badalyan, OSCE/ODIHR Election Adviser, in Warsaw (+48 22 520 0600);
- Richard Solash, OSCE PA, in Copenhagen (+45 60 10 83 80);
- Nathalie Bargellini, PACE, in Strasbourg 9+33 6 65 40 32 82);
- Ms. Nikolina Vassileva, EP, in Brussels (+32 473 85 2369);
- Ms. Roberta Caloria, Head of Press and Media, NATO PA, in Brussels (+32 2 504 8154).

OSCE/ODIHR EOM Address:
15 Leiptsyzka Street, 6th floor
03062 Kyiv, Ukraine
Tel: +380-44-498 1900
Fax: +3380-44-498 1900
email: office@odihr.org.ua
Website: http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/116545

[63] Information provided by the CEC chairperson at 03:15 a.m.

United Nations A/68/896

General Assembly

Distr.: General
2 June 2014

Original: English

Sixty-eighth session
Agenda items 14 and 118

Integrated and coordinated implementation of and follow-up to the outcomes of the major United Nations conferences and summits in the economic, social and related fields

Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit

Letter dated 29 May 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Sweden to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to bring to your attention that parliamentarians from around the world met in Stockholm from 23 to 25 April 2014 to review successes and challenges in achieving the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development, adopted in Cairo in 1994. The sixth International Parliamentarians' Conference on the Implementation of the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development was organized by the Government of Sweden and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and provided another opportunity for lawmakers to reaffirm their commitment to keeping women's and young people's rights and sexual and reproductive well-being a priority in the post-2015 development framework.

The meeting in Stockholm focused on the links between population and sustainable development. In particular, the parliamentarians underlined the importance of protecting the rights of women and adolescents and of providing comprehensive reproductive health services and education on sexuality in order to promote economic growth and social development.

The conference, which coinciding with the twentieth anniversary of the International Conference on Population and Development, was part of several global initiatives in the context of the Programme of Action beyond 2014 process, which will culminate in the special session of the General Assembly on the follow-up to the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development beyond 2014, to be held on 22 September in New York.

Parliamentarians have long been actively engaged in advocating for the full implementation of the Programme of Action. Their role in establishing effective mechanisms for the review and oversight of government administration of the Programme of Action were both acknowledged at the International Conference on Population and Development and in the recent global survey report of the Secretary-

Please recycle

General, entitled "Framework of Actions for the follow-up to the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development beyond 2014" (A/69/62). That role was further recognized by the parliamentarians themselves at the recent International Parliamentarians' Conference, when they adopted the "Stockholm statement of commitment" (see annex).

Parliamentarians also committed to mobilizing their constituencies and governments to make bold efforts to ensure that the principles of the Programme of Action are fully integrated into the post-2015 global development agenda and that human rights, gender equality, women and young people are at its heart.

The Stockholm statement of commitment is one of the strongest outcomes of the Programme of Action beyond 2014 process and its contribution to the post-2015 discussions. In this regard, I would be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be distributed as a document of the General Assembly under agenda items 14 and 118.

(*Signed*) Mårten **Grunditz**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex to the letter dated 29 May 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Sweden to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Stockholm statement of commitment on the implementation of the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development beyond 2014

1. We as parliamentarians from all regions of the world gathered in Stockholm, Sweden, from 23 to 25 April 2014, to set a course of action for the implementation of the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development beyond 2014.

2. We meet at a time when the General Assembly of the United Nations, in its resolution 65/234, has decided to extend the Programme of Action beyond 2014 and has completed a review of the implementation of the Programme of Action "on the basis of the highest-quality data and analysis of the state of population and development ... taking into account the need for a systematic, comprehensive and integrated approach to population and development issues"; and has stressed the need to respond to "new challenges relevant to population and development and to the changing development environment", and to reinforce "the integration of the population and development agenda in global processes related to development".

3. We recognize the need for the full implementation of the Programme of Action and the key actions for its further implementation and acknowledge the findings and recommendations of the review (A/69/62), including from the global thematic meetings on youth, human rights and women's health, as well as the outcomes of the regional reviews, which constitute plans of action for the respective regions.

4. We stress the importance of the further implementation of the Programme of Action beyond 2014 on the basis of the findings and recommendations of the review, including the outcomes of the regional reviews.

5. We take note of the forthcoming special session of the General Assembly on the follow-up to the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development beyond 2014, to be held on 22 September 2014, and commit to work with our Governments to ensure that the outcome of the special session constitutes the basis for further implementation of the Programme of Action, and to integrate it into the post-2015 development agenda.

6. We recall and commend the positive contribution of parliamentarians towards the achievement of the goals and objectives of the Programme of Action, including the work done by previous International Parliamentarians' Conferences on the implementation of the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development, held in 2002, in Ottawa; in 2004, in Strasbourg, France; in 2006, in Bangkok; in 2009, in Addis Ababa; and in 2012, in Istanbul, Turkey.

7. We note that while progress has been made by our countries towards the achievement of the goals and objectives of the Programme of Action, challenges remain to fully implement the Programme of Action and achieve the Millennium Development Goals, in particular target (b) of Goal 5, on universal access to sexual and reproductive health.

8. We also note that achieving inclusive economic and social development requires appropriate legislation, national policies and programmes that guarantee and promote human rights, dignity and equality for all.

9. We are concerned that despite the gains made in the past 20 years, these gains have not been experienced equally by all, and that a considerable number of people continue to live in conditions of extreme poverty, without the fulfilment of their human rights and fundamental freedoms.

10. We note that despite the vast possibilities created by digital communication tools, a great number of people lack access to these tools, thereby hindering their ability to benefit from the new economy.

11. We recognize the critical interlinkages between population and sustained economic growth and sustainable development and their central importance in addressing development challenges and priorities, particularly in improving the quality of life of all people without distinction of any kind.

12. We also recognize the importance of the above-mentioned interlinkages in eradicating poverty and social inequities; achieving universal access to quality primary and secondary education; achieving gender equality; achieving universal health coverage; improving maternal and child health; expanding family planning services of high quality, and access to a mix of modern contraceptive methods which take into account client choices and clinical needs; promoting sexual and reproductive health and rights; preventing and treating sexually transmitted infections, including HIV/AIDS; and eliminating gender-based violence as well as harmful practices against women and girls; and addressing the health and other impacts of alcohol and drug abuse.

13. We recognize the opportunity to shape the new international development agenda that will succeed the Millennium Development Goals by ensuring that the vision, principles, objectives and goals of the Programme of Action and the priorities emanating from the review of its implementation are reflected in the ongoing discussions on the Millennium Development Goals and on sustainable development goals and are integrated into the post-2015 development agenda.

14. To this end, we commit to mobilize our constituencies and Governments to support a post-2015 development paradigm based on human rights that ensures gender equality, women's and adolescents' sexual and reproductive health and rights, and comprehensive development for youth.

15. We call for targets and indicators on sexual and reproductive health and rights to be included in the stand-alone goals on gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls; for a universal health goal, including for universal health coverage; and for targets and indicators on the rights of young people, including investing in the quality of their education, in decent employment opportunities and effective livelihood skills, as part of the post-2015 development agenda.

16. We further call for the integration of population dynamics in all development planning at the national and subnational levels as a critical foundation for sustainable development, taking into account the need for a life cycle approach from birth to ageing, in order to ensure lifelong capabilities and resilience.

We Parliamentarians, consistent with the principles of the Programme of Action, are determined to play our role as legislators, as follows:

Policies, programmes and laws that promote and protect the rights of all

We commit to work to:

17. Enact and advocate for the enforcement of laws and policies to respect and protect the sexual and reproductive health and rights of all individuals;

18. Promulgate, where absent, and advocate for the enforcement of laws to prevent and punish hate crimes without distinction of any kind, and take active steps to protect all persons from discrimination, stigmatization and violence.

Policies, programmes and laws that promote and protect the rights of women and girls and young people

19. We commit to work to:

(a) Adopt laws to promote and protect human rights and eliminate discrimination without distinction of any kind;

(b) Design policies and programmes that harness the demographic dividend through enhancing the capabilities of young people to contribute to social and economic development and innovation;

(c) Promote access to sexual and reproductive health and rights for all persons, including quality health care and youth-friendly sexual and reproductive health services, while removing legal, regulatory and social barriers to reproductive health information and services for adolescents, and ensure access to contraception as well as to a wide range of modern methods of family planning, and emergency contraception, as recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO);

(d) Promote and protect the rights of young people to access a good quality of education at all levels, including comprehensive sexuality education, taking into account those young people who are out of school while also ensuring equal enrolment and retention of girls and boys in primary and secondary school and in higher levels of education;

(e) Support policies that keep the girl child, including married girls and pregnant girls, in school at all levels of education without discrimination, and ensure admission or re-entry to school after delivery;

(f) Promote effective policies and programmes that provide appropriate skills for young people, preparing them for employment and long-term decent work, consistent with international conventions;

(g) Promote gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls and ensure women's full participation in political and decision-making processes;

(h) Promote the enactment and implementation of laws to ensure the economic and social empowerment of women through equal access to ownership and control of economic resources, technology and markets, including land, property and inheritance rights;

(i) Call for the enactment or ratification of global and regional legal frameworks that combat gender-based violence, and ensure the provision of sexual and reproductive health and rights services as part of initial emergency responses, revise laws that exonerate perpetrators of violence against women and girls, including sexual violence, and eliminate sexual violence from conflict and post-conflict

amnesty provisions within the framework of strengthened legislation enforcement to end impunity, consistent with Security Council resolution 1325 (2000);

(j) Adopt legislation, policies and measures that prevent, punish and eradicate gender-based violence within and outside of the family, within communities, and in conflict and post-conflict situations;

(k) Promote legislation to eliminate child, early and forced marriage, by enacting and enforcing laws on the minimum legal age of marriage of 18 years; and eliminate harmful practices such as female genital mutilation/cutting;

(l) Promote legislation to prevent adolescent pregnancy and unsafe abortion, including through enhancing the status of women and girls and addressing the negative social consequences of gender stereotypes, through comprehensive sexuality education for both boys and girls. This education must include accurate information taking into account scientific data and evidence about human sexuality, including: growth and development; anatomy and physiology; reproduction, pregnancy and childbirth; HIV and sexually transmitted infections; family life and interpersonal relationships; culture and sexuality; human rights protection, fulfilment and empowerment; non-discrimination, equality and gender roles; sexual behaviour; sexual abuse, gender-based violence and harmful practices;

(m) Work with governments on urgent, concrete measures to further reduce abortion-related complications and deaths by providing non-discriminatory universal post-abortion care that meets WHO guidelines; to remove legal barriers preventing women and adolescent girls from access to safe abortion, including revising restrictions within existing abortion laws, and, where legal, ensure the availability of safe, good-quality abortion services, in order to safeguard the lives of women and girls;

(n) Review and repeal laws that punish women and girls who have undergone illegal abortions, as well as end imprisonment for such acts, bearing in mind that in no circumstances should abortion be considered as a family planning method.

Budget allocations and enabling environment for implementing the Programme of Action

We commit to:

20. Advocate for the allocation of appropriate resources and create an enabling environment for implementing the Programme of Action and the recommendations of the review of the implementation of the Programme of Action beyond 2014;

21. Advocate for increased development assistance budgets for population assistance, and ensure the target of 0.7 per cent of gross national product (GNP) for official development assistance, as agreed at the previous International Parliamentarians' Conferences on the Implementation of the Programme of Action;

22. Advocate for policies and programmes with clear goals and budget allocations and indicators to measure compliance on human rights and fundamental freedoms;

23. Advocate for non-discriminatory universal, free, public, high-quality, intercultural education for youth, to ensure social inclusion and intergenerational resilience.

Strengthening parliamentary oversight

We will further work with our parliaments to:

24. Ensure stronger political commitment for the further implementation of the Programme of Action and the recommendations arising from the review thereof and will use our oversight role to keep Governments accountable to the commitments made;

25. Ensure that appropriate population, health, gender and development data, disaggregated, inter alia, by sex, age and disability, is made publicly available in order to facilitate the sharing and use of knowledge and improve public accountability;

26. Ensure effective oversight of programmes and work with our respective Governments to promote and facilitate the active participation of all constituencies, including non-state actors, in order to guarantee transparency and the rule of law and improved governance at the local, national, regional and global levels;

27. Hold our respective States accountable for the implementation of appropriate and transparent governance institutions and mechanisms that prevent and sanction human rights violations and which ensure that all victims, particularly victims of gender-based violence, have a right to reparation and justice.

Political commitment and building partnerships

We commit to:

28. Advocate for the role of civil society, including non-governmental organizations and youth groups in the formulation, monitoring and evaluation of population and development policies and programmes, including for achieving the goals concerning sexual and reproductive health and rights;

29. Promote strengthened partnerships with the private sector in the design, implementation, coordination, monitoring and evaluation of population and development programmes and policies, in particular in the areas of service delivery and commodity production, security and distribution;

30. Hold our respective States accountable for the establishment of appropriate and transparent governance institutions and mechanisms that ensure effective participation, without any form of discrimination, of adolescents and young people in public debate, in decision-making and in all policy and programme phases, in particular on matters that affect them directly;

31. Ensure firm commitment to justice, transparency, integrity and equal participation in all governance processes, in a way that enables all to participate in the process of national development;

32. Promote and protect human rights and eliminate discrimination, without distinction of any kind, recognizing that human rights for all are key to achieving the goals of the Programme of Action;

33. Strengthen parliamentary cross-party networks at the country, regional and global levels, to facilitate the exchange of best practices and strengthen the effectiveness of parliaments and to achieve the commitments made at the International Parliamentarians' Conferences on the Implementation of the Programme of Action.

Pledge

We the parliamentarians from all regions gathered in Stockholm:

34. Call upon the General Assembly to act on the findings and recommendations of the review of the implementation of the Programme of Action beyond 2014 and to integrate them into the post-2015 development agenda;

35. Commit to systematically and actively monitor the progress and impact of our work through our national and regional parliamentary structures in partnership with United Nations partners, civil society and youth;

36. Express our determination to ensure that all individuals are entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, without distinction of any kind, including sexual and reproductive health and rights, in order to fully extend the principles of equality, dignity and rights to future generations and ensure sustainable development.

United Nations A/68/897

General Assembly

Distr.: General
30 May 2014

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-eighth session
Agenda item 76 (a)
Oceans and the law of the sea

Letter dated 28 May 2014 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Viet Nam to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith a diplomatic note dated 23 May 2014 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam addressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China concerning China's continued illegal operation of the oil rig Haiyang Shiyou 981 in the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of Viet Nam since 1 May 2014 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly under agenda item 76 (a).

(*Signed*) **Nguyen** Trac Ba
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

14-54371 (E) 030614

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 28 May 2014 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Viet Nam to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China and, with reference to the latter's diplomatic note dated 5 May 2014, has the honour to inform as follows:

1. Despite Viet Nam's serious communications at various levels and under various forms, China has not stopped its infringement of Viet Nam's sovereign rights and jurisdiction over its exclusive economic zone and continental shelf as defined in accordance with the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, to which both Viet Nam and China are parties. Once again, Viet Nam demands that China immediately withdraw its oil rig Haiyang Shiyou 981 and escort vessels from Viet Nam's maritime zones and stop all activities that are interfering with maritime safety and security and affecting regional peace and security. Once China pulls out its oil rig, the two sides shall immediately exchange views on measures to contain and stabilize the situation and on maritime issues between the two countries.

2. In the above-mentioned diplomatic note and in other communications with Viet Nam, China maintains that the placement of oil rig Haiyang Shiyou 981 is within the waters of the "Xisha" Islands. Viet Nam once again reaffirms that the "Xisha" Islands referred to by China is Viet Nam's Hoang Sa Archipelago (also known as the Paracel Islands), which China has unlawfully occupied by force since 1974. The two sides should conduct negotiations on the sovereignty over the Hoang Sa Archipelago and on whose right to carry out activities to explore and exploit the natural resources at the location where the oil rig Haiyang Shiyou 981 is currently placed. At the meeting with Comrade Le Duan, First Secretary of the Viet Nam Labour Party, in Beijing in September 1975, Comrade Deng Xiaoping, Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and Vice-Premier of the State Council of China, admitted that there were differences between Viet Nam and China concerning the sovereignty over the Hoang Sa and Truong Sa archipelagos and that the two sides would negotiate to settle the issue at a later stage. The Government of Viet Nam once again respectfully requests the Government of China, in the light of that spirit, to promptly commence Government-level negotiations between Viet Nam and China on the sovereignty over the Hoang Sa Archipelago.

3. At the 16 May 2014 press conference held by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China stated that Viet Nam had designated 57 oil and gas blocks, including 7 oil and gas fields in production and 37 drilling platforms, in the disputed waters. This claim was made by China without any legal basis. Viet Nam, therefore, firmly rejects this wrongful claim by China and, at the same time, reaffirms that all oil and gas activities of Viet Nam are conducted within the continental shelf of Viet Nam as defined in compliance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China the assurances of its highest consideration.

United Nations A/68/898

General Assembly

Distr.: General
2 June 2014

Original: English

Sixty-eighth session
Agenda item 116 (h)
Appointments to fill vacancies in subsidiary organs and other appointments: appointment of a member of the Joint Inspection Unit

Appointment of a member of the Joint Inspection Unit

Note by the President of the General Assembly

1. As indicated in paragraph 6 of the note by the Secretary-General of 17 April 2013 (A/68/107), the General Assembly is required, during its current session, to appoint one member of the Joint Inspection Unit to fill the vacancy that will arise from the expiration on 31 December 2014 of the term of office of Tadanori Inomata.

2. In accordance with the procedures described in article 3, paragraph 1, of the statute of the Joint Inspection Unit and with General Assembly resolution 61/238, the President of the General Assembly, having held the necessary consultations, and on the basis of the candidate submitted by the Asia-Pacific States, requested Jordan to propose a candidate (see annex I).

3. The candidate, in accordance with paragraph 7 of General Assembly resolution 59/267, should have experience in at least one of the following fields: oversight, audit, inspection, investigation, evaluation, finance, project evaluation, programme evaluation, human resources management, management, public administration, monitoring and/or programme performance, as well as knowledge of the United Nations system and its role in international relations.

4. The President of the General Assembly has held the consultations described in article 3, paragraph 2, of the statute of the Joint Inspection Unit, including consultations with the President of the Economic and Social Council and with the Secretary-General in his capacity as Chair of the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination. The replies received from the President of the Council and from the Secretary-General to the identical letters addressed to them on 6 December 2013 by the President of the Assembly are annexed to the present note (see annexes II and III).

5. Having completed the required consultations, the President of the General Assembly has the honour to submit to the Assembly the following candidate for appointment as a member of the Joint Inspection Unit for a five-year term beginning on 1 January 2015 and expiring on 31 December 2019:

Rajab M. Sukayri (Jordan)

14-54372 (E) 040614

Please recycle

Annex I

Note verbale dated 9 October 2013 from the Permanent Mission of Jordan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretariat

The Permanent Mission of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretariat of the United Nations and has the honour to inform the latter of the candidature of Rajab M. Sukayri for membership in the Joint Inspection Unit, for the term 2015-2019, at the elections to be held during the sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly. Mr. Sukayri's curriculum vitae is attached hereto (see enclosure).

The Permanent Mission of Jordan has the honour to further inform that the candidature of Jordan has been endorsed by the Asia-Pacific States.

Enclosure

Curriculum vitae*

Rajab M. Sukayri

Marital status

Married with 5 children

Qualifications

- Doctor of Diplomatic Studies
  Australian National University, Canberra — Australia
- M.A. Political Science
  Carleton University, Ottawa — Canada
- Graduate Studies in Political Science
  American University of Beirut, Beirut — Lebanon, and
  Queens University, Kingston — Canada
- B.A. Business Administration
  University of Jordan, Amman — Jordan

Positions

December 2011-Present	Permanent Representative of Jordan to the United Nations Office and other international organizations in Geneva During his Geneva post, Mr. Sukayri was elected for the following positions: • Vice President, the 101st International Labour Conference (2012) • Chairman, Asian Group, Human Rights Council (2013) • Member, Consultative Group, Human Rights Council (2013) • Chairman, Selection Committee, the 102nd International Labour Conference (2013)
October 2010-November 2011	Director, Department of Human Rights Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Amman — Jordan
August 2005-August 2010	Ambassador of Jordan to Australia, Non-Resident Ambassador of Jordan to New Zealand
August 2004-August 2005	Director, Cabinet of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Official Spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Jordan

* Curricula vitae are issued without formal editing.

August 1999-August 2004	Ambassador of Jordan to China, Non-Resident Ambassador of Jordan to Viet Nam and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
	Dean of Arab Ambassadors and Chairman of the Arab Ambassadors' Council Beijing — China
1996-1999	Director, Department of International Organizations Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Amman — Jordan
	Part-time Lecturer Institute of Diplomacy, Amman — Jordan
1991-1996	Minister Plenipotentiary at the Permanent Mission of Jordan to the United Nations, New York, during which Mr. Sukayri was elected to the following positions:
	1994* Vice Chairman, Disarmament Commission
	1995* Vice Chairman, Main Committee II, 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
	1995* Rapporteur, First Committee of the General Assembly, fiftieth session
	1996* Rapporteur, United Nations Disarmament Commission
1976-1991	Ambassador Sukayri served as Third, Second and First Secretary at the Jordanian Embassies in Beirut (Lebanon), Kuwait City (Kuwait), and Ottawa (Canada) with intervals at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Amman — Jordan
1974-1976	Attaché at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Amman — Jordan

During his diplomatic career, Mr. Sukayri attended a plethora of conferences, seminars, workshops and symposiums dealing with diplomacy, conflict resolution, negotiations, United Nations peacekeeping, arms control and disarmament. In 1993, Mr. Sukayri was awarded the United Nations Disarmament Fellowship.

Decorations

- In 1999, His Majesty King Abdullah II Ibn Al Hussein conferred upon Mr. Sukayri the Independence Medal of First Order.
- In 2002, Mr. Sukayri was awarded the "Award of Excellence" by His Majesty King Abdullah II Ibn Al Hussein.

Annex II

Letter dated 6 March 2014 from the President of the Economic and Social Council to the President of the General Assembly

I have the honour of writing to you in response to your letter of 6 December 2013, regarding consultations held with the Chairs of the regional groups to appoint a member to fill a vacancy in the Joint Inspection Unit that will occur on 31 December 2014.

I wish to inform you, in my capacity as President of the Economic and Social Council, as provided for in article 3, paragraph 2, of the statute of the Joint Inspection Unit and in accordance with General Assembly resolution 59/267, that I have reviewed the qualifications of the proposed candidate and have the pleasure to inform you that I am in full agreement with the proposal to nominate Mr. Rajab M. Sukayri (Jordan).

(*Signed*) Martin **Sajdik**
President of the Economic and Social Council

Annex III

Letter dated 28 May 2014 from the Secretary-General in his capacity as Chair of the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination addressed to the President of the General Assembly

I have the honour to refer to your letter of 6 December 2013 regarding the proposed appointment of Rajab M. Sukayri, effective 1 January 2015.

In accordance with article 3, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Joint Inspection Unit, and following consultations with members of the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB), I have the pleasure to inform you that I concur, in my capacity as Chair of CEB, with the appointment of Mr. Sukayri.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

United Nations A/68/899–S/2014/384

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
2 June 2014

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-eighth session
Agenda item 53
Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects

Security Council
Sixty-ninth year

Letter dated 1 June 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith the concept note for the Security Council open debate on the theme "United Nations peacekeeping operations: new trends" to be held on 11 June 2014 under the presidency of the Russian Federation in the Security Council (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would circulate the present letter and its annex as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 53, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Vitaly **Churkin**

14-54450 (E) 040614 040614

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 1 June 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: Russian]

United Nations peacekeeping operations: new trends

Concept note

In its capacity as President of the Security Council, the Russian Federation will hold an open debate entitled "United Nations peacekeeping operations: new trends" on 11 June 2014. During this event, which will include the Security Council members, the broader United Nations membership, including troop- and police-contributing countries, and the United Nations Secretariat, a lively exchange of views is expected on one of the most pressing and relevant areas of the world organization's work. The Secretary-General of the United Nations will deliver an address.

The evolution in United Nations approaches to peacekeeping has been determined, above all, by the changing nature of the conflicts that the Organization must address. Today, unlike during the era of "classic" peacekeeping, the vast majority of crises in which United Nations peacekeeping operations are deployed or their mandates extended are non-international armed conflicts, often referred to as internal or intra-State conflicts (generally involving a confrontation between government forces and non-State armed groups). The causes of these conflicts and their complicating factors are many and varied, but generally speaking, they have one thing in common: the key to their settlement lies in national reconciliation. The sole exception would be cases where there are terrorist organizations and transnational armed groups present that may have an interest in the existence of a power vacuum at the national level and that have no concerns or interests inside the country where they are operating.

While peacekeeping operations are often deployed to resolve such intra-State conflicts, what is new is that now they often have no choice but to act in circumstances where there is little or no peace to keep and where peacekeepers may face non-traditional threats and heightened security risks. The conventional wisdom is that, in such circumstances, greater international engagement can, at the very least, provide a stabilizing impulse. Under these circumstances, there is a growing need to take into account the readiness of troop-contributing countries to take on such elevated risks. Moreover, it is frequently the case that the United Nations "blue helmets" are deployed alongside foreign military contingents already in the field (from either individual States or regional organizations), regional and international envoys, or special missions. This creates additional challenges, as well as opportunities for closer partnerships.

1. One of the milestones for United Nations peacekeeping along this path was the adoption in March 2013 of Security Council resolution 2098 (2013) extending the mandate of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and establishing within the Mission an Intervention Brigade authorized to use force preventively and to carry out targeted offensive operations. A short time later, the Security Council adopted resolution 2100 (2013) on the establishment of a peacekeeping operation in Mali. Considering

the specific threats present in that country, the Security Council authorized the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate, including deterring threats and taking active steps to prevent the return of armed elements to key population centres. Earlier fairly common mandates stipulating the use of "all necessary means/actions" should also be taken into account. In some cases, peacekeepers used a greater degree of force; the actions of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire under Security Council resolution 1933 (2010) are an example of that.

These new circumstances of United Nations peacekeeping do not seem to be fully in line with, and in some cases may even run counter to, the fundamental principles of peacekeeping. It is clear that the problem should be appropriately reflected in peacekeeping instruments negotiated by Member States. In the meantime, we are dealing with a fragmented approach to trends that are gaining momentum.

The Organization, as embodied by the Secretariat and the Member States, with the troop-contributing countries playing a key role, will inevitably face the challenge of clearly and effectively formulating positions on a wide range of issues related to "robust" operations, assessment of their effectiveness and the impact on the image of the Organization. This applies, inter alia, to a well-defined rationale and a clear understanding of their purpose and actions (including such issues as "Whose side should we take?" and "How do we ensure strong efforts to promote national reconciliation?") When one of the parties to an internal conflict is the Government, overcoming the clash between the principle of host country consent and that of impartiality is very difficult, as the situations of a number of current missions have demonstrated. The definition of clear and timely stabilization strategies and military concepts, the scope of the use of force, effective leadership and command, and generating the necessary forces and assets, including proper training and logistical support for peacekeeping forces, are critical. There is also a need to reflect on the new challenges that will inevitably arise in the work of United Nations personnel, including humanitarian personnel, who are present in the field along with peacekeeping operations.

In these new conditions, the issue of security for peacekeepers becomes increasingly pressing, particularly in situations where threats to peacekeepers originate with non-State armed groups. A possible increase in casualties among peacekeepers through their direct participation in hostilities is also a source of serious concern (although current statistics show that casualties are mainly attributable to situations of self-defence). Member States and the United Nations Secretariat will need to have a serious discussion to clarify issues related to the loss of peacekeepers' special protected status under international humanitarian law and legal aspects of their responsibility for violation of that law.

Moreover, peacekeepers must have the necessary equipment, security perimeters, vehicles and other items that would enable them to operate safely. This could, however, lead to resource costs, which must be discussed in the relevant intergovernmental bodies.

2. The question of resources and the operational and technical strengthening of United Nations peacekeeping operations, including through the use of high-tech equipment, is also, to some extent, related to the new, "ambitious" mandates. All the more so as there is growing recognition that advanced technology (including

unarmed unmanned aerial vehicles and the latest in medical and engineering equipment) can contribute to the fuller implementation of mandates by peacekeepers and improved safety and security of personnel, as well as better situational awareness. Such positive elements were mentioned in the recent briefing by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in the Security Council.

However, despite an overall positive attitude to the idea of upgrading peacekeeping operations, discussion of specific new technologies, especially unarmed unmanned aerial vehicles, has pointed to a number of issues in the political, legal and budgetary areas. There are concerns on monitoring information received and ensuring its confidentiality. The practice of deploying unarmed unmanned aerial vehicles in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has also revealed problems related to timing and economic and operational effectiveness, as well as related human resources issues. In a letter addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2013/44), the President of the Security Council noted that in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo "external imagery/electronic equipment and associated analysis capabilities, notably surveillance capability such as that provided by unmanned aerial systems, may be used ... to enhance situational awareness, if available, on a case-by-case basis and without prejudice to the ongoing consideration by relevant United Nations bodies of legal, financial and technical implications of the use of unmanned aerial systems."

To date, such a discussion in the relevant intergovernmental bodies of the United Nations has been extremely fragmented in nature, but the time has come for the Organization to develop a balanced approach, including in the form of policy documents.

There is no doubt that all United Nations peacekeeping operations should have the necessary resources, including the tools and capabilities, to fulfil their mandates. One model that has seen intensive development recently is the temporary movement of personnel and equipment between missions to fill gaps in capacity, for example, when a situation deteriorates sharply. That mechanism has proven effective in a number of cases. However, inter-mission cooperation should not affect the quality of the delivery of each mission's mandates, the security of peacekeepers or the level of budgetary discipline. There is also the question of troop-contributing countries' willingness to deliver capacity and resources to carry out tasks in more difficult settings or in settings that are simply different.

3. Contemporary multi-component mission mandates have become more complex and include, in addition to the tasks of restoring security in the host countries, multiple peacebuilding tasks, up to and including the integrated restoration of statehood in the broadest sense of the word. Recent experience prompts us to ask whether the Organization is capable, from both the political and resource standpoints, of assuming the full range of tasks all at once, especially in cases where conflict is cyclical and characterized by periods of dramatic deterioration of the security situation. It appears that in some cases there is a need to set priorities in the mandates through the sequencing of tasks, so that when missions are overburdened there is no impact on their ability to maintain security and facilitate the political process and national reconciliation.

These points do not, of course, represent an exhaustive list of new trends in United Nations peacekeeping, but perhaps encompass those that are most pressing and that most strongly affect its qualitative transformation. The fragmented nature

of the inter-State policy and legal framework dictates the need to continue active discussions among Member States, the development of the relevant doctrines and, in the foreseeable future, the elaboration and adoption of policy instruments in the light of lessons learned.

There is no doubt that the central role in the formulation of such decisions by Member States and in providing guidance to the Secretariat on general peacekeeping issues falls to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations of the General Assembly. Logistical, budgetary and staffing matters should be discussed in the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly. Productive discussion in those bodies is necessary for the Security Council to take informed decisions in developing the individual mandates of peacekeeping missions, taking into account the views of troop-contributing countries and the situation on the ground.

Inclusive interaction within the framework of the General Assembly and the Security Council will provide the Secretariat with the necessary guidance and strengthen the strategic partnership in United Nations peacekeeping, whose main virtues are its universal character and unique legitimacy.

The feasibility of developing a possible outcome document will be determined on the basis of the upcoming open debate.